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 Many have argued that government “should be run like a business.”  This 
argument has evolved throughout the years, but implies that implementing performance 
measures, benchmarks and incentives will provide inducements for improving 
organizational performance.  While the literature is replete with such arguments, there 
has been little attention paid to the “wrong-side” of performance management and 
whether incentive structures result in instances where individuals and organizations 
engage in efforts to cheat, or “game the system.” 
 The nation’s child support program is a good example of a government program 
that has adopted an incentive-based approach.  Four state child support agencies, 
representing varied degrees of performance, allowed their staff to participate in a survey 
that explored issues of cheating and knowledge of the child support incentive program.   
 This study constructed cheating as the capability of artificially inflating 
performance levels.  The underlying research hypothesis, based on principal-agency 
theory, suggested that higher levels of cheating would be found among higher incentive 
earning states.  The findings of the study suggested otherwise. 
 The study found that while front-line child support professionals identified 
performance as being important, few were aware that a child support incentive system 
existed.  This finding is important as it suggests that the incentive structure does little to 
influence front-line worker behavior and does not appear to have much impact on 





workers’ performance levels.  Furthermore, there appeared to be no difference in 
knowledge levels among workers between high and low performing states.   
Using multivariate analysis, the key finding of the study was that respondents 
reporting high levels of role conflict, and lower levels of job satisfaction were more likely 
to report feeling pressure to cheat.  The finding related to role conflict is consistent with 
the constructs of principal-agency theory suggesting that the more clearly roles are 
defined, the less likely agents are to act against the wishes of principals.  The link 
between job satisfaction and role conflict on feeling pressure to cheat provides an 
intriguing starting point from which to further explore the issue of cheating and the 
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 Public administration in the United States has a lengthy obsession with the values 
and practices associated with democracy on the one hand, and with values and practices 
of the business world on the other.  The discipline of public administration has struggled 
throughout its history with reconciling these two distinct philosophical approaches to 
public management.  In recent years, the field has leaned heavily toward the business 
model, with members of Congress, presidents, scholars, and the media asserting that 
government should be run more like a business. 
 This call to action has been bolstered by the implementation of incentive 
programs, performance management, and privatization for public government services.   
While the rhetoric espouses the intrinsic worth of these private-sector influenced 
methods, there has been limited, though insightful, discussion in the public administration 
literature pertaining to the possibility that these types of programs may introduce 
questionable practices within public organizations.   
 Personal experience has caused this author to inquire of the inherently 
problematic aspects associated with incentive structures and performance measurement 
systems in the public sector.  While the literature suggests the possibility of employees 
manipulating performance, there has been little empirical work conducted on the subject.  
The questions remain: do incentive systems offer perverse incentives to organizations and 
their employees to perform well in incentive areas?  Is it possible that performance 
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management systems can be manipulated by organizations and their employees?  If this 
manipulation occurs, under what conditions does it take place?  Do certain organizational 
characteristics curtail or enhance the likelihood of what Bohte and Meier (2000) call 
organizational cheating?  These fundamental questions represent the underpinnings of 
this study. 
 Bohte and Meier (2000) studied the occurrences of organizational cheating within 
Texas public school systems prior to the national passage of the No Child Left Behind 
(NCLB) initiative.  Their findings suggested that schools lacking resources and those that 
felt pressure from “extreme task demands” were more likely to cheat than other schools.  
Bohte and Meier concluded their article by calling on the discipline of public 
administration to pay more attention to the conditions under which organizations may 
feel pressure to cheat and to remedy those situations accordingly.  This study attempts to 
answer Bohte and Meier’s call to action by focusing on the impact the nation’s child 
support incentive system has on front-line child support workers. 
 The nation’s child support program presents a valuable case study in relation to 
the problematic side of incentive systems and performance management.  Since so many 
aspects of the child support program are related to collections, the process of quantifying 
inputs, outputs, and outcomes has been relatively simple compared with other social 
welfare programs.  In addition, the child support program is one based on a shared 
partnership between the federal and state governments.  Under this partnership, states 
have been given a great deal of latitude in establishing the ways in which they choose to 
organize themselves.  Some states have chosen to centralize service delivery, while others 
rely on programs administered at the local level.  In addition, some states rely on private 
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service contracts to provide services to the public.  This organizational diversity allows 
for a comparison between states and the subsequent methods each adopts to perform 
effectively. 
 More important, however, is each state’s ability to participate in an active 
incentive program which seeks to reward states for performing well on a predetermined 
performance objective system.  The incentive-based program identifies key performance 
areas for the child support program in five substantive areas.  Ultimately states can 
“maximize” their incentive dollars by scoring well on preselected performance standards.  
Earned incentive dollars are intended to be reinvested in the child support program to 
improve the program’s effectiveness.  It is also important to note that penalties exist for 
poor performance in several of the performance measures.  It is, therefore, in each state’s 
best interest to perform well in the program. 
 This study examines the degree to which the federal child support incentive 
program acts as a constraint upon street-level child support workers and their daily work 
activities.  If the incentive system acts as a mechanism to focus worker’s tasks, a 
subsequent research question surrounds the likelihood of child support agencies’ 
willingness to engage in manipulative behaviors by attempting to artificially increase 
performance in the key incentive areas.  Specifically, this study will explore the 
experiences of individual child support workers and the pressures they may feel to 
engage in these questionable practices. 
 Chapter 1 of this dissertation provides an underlying foundation regarding the 
historical development of performance management systems in American public 
administration.  As mentioned previously, the concept of performance management is not 
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a new one for the discipline.  In fact, this analysis demonstrates that the issue of 
measuring performance is one that cycles through the course of our nation’s 
administrative history. 
 Chapter 2 provides a more detailed analysis of the nature of principal-agency 
theory in relation to the use of governmental incentive programs.  While some suggest 
this mode of thinking results in effective methods for instituting control and enhancing 
efficiency, others counter this idea by pointing out some of the deficiencies associated 
with principal-agent type relationships.  As this chapter demonstrates, there are some 
potentially negative consequences related to incentive systems and the use of 
performance management.  As a result, incentive programs have the potential to 
introduce perverse incentives resulting from implementation of incentive structures. 
 Chapter 3 presents a historical analysis of the development of the child support 
enforcement program in the United States.  The chapter places specific focus on the 
development of the child support incentive system in the wake of significant policy 
changes that resulted from the welfare reform initiatives of the early 1990s.  In addition, 
the chapter provides additional details concerning each of the performance measures 
including how the measures are calculated and their underlying reasons for existing. 
 Chapter 4 addresses the methodological constraints used by this study in 
attempting to address the research questions at hand.  The chapter explains that data were 
gathered from four state administered child support agencies using an online survey.  The 
chapter also provides the rationale used to categorize the four state programs in relation 
to the incentive levels each earned.  Of particular importance is identifying the 
constraining impact the incentive has at the individual worker level.   Do overwhelming 
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pressures exist within child support agencies to perform well in incentive areas?  Do 
workers feel compelled to manipulate computer systems to artificially increase 
performance outcomes?  These, and other, important questions were addressed through 
the questions posed by the survey. 
 The remaining chapters present the findings of the study.  Chapter 5 focuses on 
the results of the study concerning the knowledge street-level child support workers have 
regarding the child support incentive systems.  The results of this analysis presented some 
surprising results regarding how well workers understood the concepts and tasks related 
to the incentive system.  Chapter 6 focuses specifically on assessing the level of 
organizational cheating in each of the agencies studied, while Chapters 7 and 8 focus on 
eight independent variables and their subsequent impact on cheating. Finally, Chapter 9 
implements a multivariate logistic model that tests the effects of several key variables on 
the pressure to cheat. 
 Performance management systems and incentive programs have been 
implemented in a wide-range of programs to enhance their effectiveness and their value 
to the public at large.  While this study does not adopt the perspective that performance 
management systems are inherently bad, it does highlight deficiencies and unintended 
consequences that emerge when implementing these types of programs.  The primary 
justification for writing this dissertation is to shed some light on attempts to develop 
performance management systems in a way that does not compromise the integrity of 














 One of the methods used to improve oversight and accountability in government 
has been to implement performance measurement systems in public agencies.  
Proponents of these systems argue that they have two purposes:  to enhance efficiency 
and to promote accountability of government agencies (Broom et al. 2002; Coggburn and 
Schneider 2003; De Lancer and Holzer 2001; Garvey 1995).  Heinrich (2003) relied 
heavily upon Thompson’s (1967) descriptions of organizations in developing a useful 
framework which described the development of performance measurement systems in the 
United States.  Thompson’s approach is used in this proposal as a means to facilitate a 
discussion of the history of performance measurement in the United States. 
 James Thompson suggested that organizations can best be understood by looking 
at two broad categories of organizational theory that attempt to describe how 
organizations function.  The first group, labeled as “closed systems,” relies heavily upon 
notions of rationality.  From a closed perspective, organizations are viewed as rational 
entities seeking to maximize efficiency, organizational performance, and outputs 
(Thompson 1967).  Closed system approaches tend to emphasize the organization’s need 
to establish certainty in their environment through the establishment of hierarchies, 
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formal rules, and repetitive processes (Thompson 1967).  In contrast, Thompson found 
that open system theories were not as dependent upon hierarchy and rules as closed 
system models.  Instead, open systems are viewed as “natural systems” comprised of 
interdependent parts that cooperate with one another in order to cope with uncertain and 
unstable environments (Thompson 1967).  These two approaches are used as a guiding 
theme in analyzing the historical development of performance management in American 
government. 
 
Weberian Organizational Theory 
 
 Closed system approaches rely upon the Weberian notion of bureaucracy 
(Thompson 1967).  While Weber’s writings were not translated into English until the 
mid- twentieth century, ideas closely resembling Weber’s theory of bureaucracy were 
expressed by many of the early theorists in the field of public administration.  For Weber, 
bureaucratic processes and structures were constructed by individuals in an attempt to 
accomplish a given set of goals (Coser 1977; De Lancer and Holzer 2001).  The 
underlying theme of rationality lies at the heart of Weber’s theory of bureaucracy. 
 Weber viewed organizations as embodying inherent interests, goals, and purposes 
(Thompson 1967).  The establishment of rules, hierarchy, and authority help create a 
sense of uniformity within bureaucracies to assist in accomplishing organizational 
purposes (Burke 1986; Perrow 1972).   These structures also serve to buffer the 
organization from external influences in an intentional effort to increase certainty within 
the organizational environment. 
 According to Perrow (1972, 5), the elimination of all unwanted 
“extraorganizational influences” proved to be a rational approach for maximizing 
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efficiency.  As such, the bureaucratic model exhibited the potential to remove the 
imperfections associated with human behavior from organizational settings.  “The more 
bureaucracy is ‘dehumanized’, the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from 
official business love, hatred, and all purely personal irrational and emotional elements 
which escape calculation.  This is the specific nature of bureaucracy and it is appraised as 
its special virtue” (Weber 1946, 216). 
 Other developments in the closed system approach include Taylor’s (1912) 
scientific management movement, Luther Gulick’s (1937) POSDCORB principles, and 
Chester Barnard’s (1938) influential book The Functions of the Executive.  Each of these 
approaches emphasized the role of a relatively small number of variables in environments 
where goals and tasks were known, and where a prediction of outcomes was generally 
considered to be reliable (Heinrich 2003). 
 
PPBS Budgeting and Management Systems 
Under the constructs imposed by closed system approaches, early attempts at 
developing modern performance management systems began to emerge by the 1950s.  
Many of these approaches were imported to public sector organizations from the business 
world.  One of the first attempts at developing a more holistic approach to systematic 
management was Planning Programming Budgeting Systems (PPBS) (Gosling 2002; 
Nelson et al. 1998). 
 Schick (1966) identified PPBS as moving beyond control and managerial 
budgeting through the use of extensive planning and goal setting.  “One of the major aims 
of PPB[S] is to convert the annual process of preparing a budget into a conscious 
appraisal and formulation of future goals and policies” (Schick 1966, 244).  Schick 
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claimed that the three functions of budgeting (control, management, and planning) would 
come into balance under PPBS.  Most importantly, PPBS required top policy makers to 
establish broad policy objectives (Schick 1966).  Once these objectives were identified, 
they acted as a constraint for lower ranking officials in the bureaucracy and served as a 
guide for subsequent actions.   
 While PPBS promised to improve government, it eventually failed as a budgeting 
system in the United States.  The reasons for its failure included the difficulty of 
identifying measurable objectives, inadequate training in implementing PPBS for agency 
budgeting officials, and the fractured federal governmental structure which hindered 
coordination efforts between the executive and legislative branches (Gosling 2002).  
 
Management by Objectives 
 
 Another private sector management approach that was applied to the public sector 
was Management by Objectives (MBO).  This approach, developed by Peter Drucker 
(1954), placed a heavy emphasis on the role of management in accomplishing 
organizational objectives.  According to Drucker, management has three distinct 
purposes: ensuring economic performance, enhancing efficiency/productivity, and 
managing people effectively to accomplish the first two managerial functions. 
 With these goals in mind, Drucker argued that the best way to improve 
management was through the systematic identification of objectives deemed critical to 
the success of an organization.  “Objectives are needed in every area where performance 
and results directly and vitally affect the survival and prosperity of the business” 
(Drucker 1954, 63).  By identifying and measuring these objectives, management would 
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improve its position to meet the needs of customers and improve organizational 
performance. 
 The importance of Drucker’s MBO model was the emphasis it placed on 
quantitative (and qualitative) measurement of individual and organizational performance 
in order to improve efficiency and productivity.  Versions of MBO were implemented in 
both the private and public sectors (Brady 1978; De Woolfson 1975) and proved to be 
influential in the development of subsequent performance management systems in 
American management. 
 
Zero Base Budgeting 
 
 A final example of a closed system model was the implementation of zero-base 
budgeting (ZBB) during the 1970s and 1980s.  After being elected president in 1976, 
Jimmy Carter brought the zero-base budgeting concept with him after using it while 
serving as governor of the state of Georgia.  ZBB required government agencies to 
construct four separate budgets on the basis of four different funding scenarios (Gosling 
2002).  This process required budgeting officials to examine their entire budget each year 
and to identify priorities within their respective programs.  While ZBB was ultimately 
abandoned by the federal government as a formal budgeting system with the election of 
Ronald Reagan, key principles of ZBB continued to be used by budget managers at both 
the federal and state levels of government (Gosling 2002).  
 It is also important to recognize that key characteristics of ZBB dealt with 
performance management and monitoring (Brown 1981; Lauth 1985).  In citing  
Georgia’s experience with ZBB, Lauth (1985) found that ZBB offered decision makers 
the opportunity to direct resources to programs that had achieved key program objectives.  
    
 
11
Brown’s (1981) article suggested that decision makers using ZBB systems would make 
their final budgetary decisions based upon which programs demonstrated high cost-
effectiveness.  In sum, ZBB presented a budgetary system that continued funding for 
programs which demonstrated effective performance in key areas. 
 The examples of MBO, PPBS, and ZBB all represented closed system approaches 
as defined by Thompson (1967) and Heinrich (2003).  Each of these perspectives 
attempted to describe organizations and how they prescribe remedies to help them 
improve performance internally.  Interestingly, each of these viewpoints describes 
organizations as endogenous entities where all variables are known and where individuals 
respond willingly to authority and rules (Heinrich 2002).  As organizations became more 
intricate over time, a new perspective would develop to account for the emerging 
complexities facing organizations. 
 
Open System Models 
 Unlike the closed system approaches, open system models viewed organizations 
as “natural systems” (Thompson 1967) where organizational structures were more fluid 
and open to outside influences.  While rational-legal models (i.e., closed system 
approaches) placed emphasis upon the bureaucratic response of buffering the 
organization from external forces, open system approaches embraced the challenges 
associated with organizational interdependence (Heinrich 2003; Thompson 1967). 
 The origin of open-systems thinking was grounded in the work of Herbert Simon 
who criticized rational-decision making processes (Thompson 1967).  Simon’s (1945) 
pointed critique found that rational decision making assumes that knowledge is complete 
and that all factors can be identified through systematic analysis.  Simon suggested that 
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this is not the case.  Instead, Simon proposed the notion of “bounded rationality” to help 
describe decision making in an environment of uncertainty and unknowns.  “In making 
administrative decisions it is continually necessary to choose factual premises where truth 
or falsehood is not definitely known …” (Simon 1945, 60).   
 Simon’s contributions to the field of organizational theory go well beyond his 
theory of decision making.  Simon’s influence helped scholars to begin questioning the 
rationally-based closed system approaches of organizational theory and move toward a 
more open, systemic conception of how organizations operate (Steiss and Daneke 1980).  
New managerial theories and concepts emerged in the wake of challenging the dogmas 
related to traditional organizational theory.  The main emphasis in many of these 
approaches embraced an external (or open) perspective in finding ways to increase 
organizational productivity in an ever increasingly interconnected world.  
 
Total Quality Management 
 Total Quality Management (TQM) emerged in the 1980s as dissatisfaction with 
previous attempts to improve management had failed (Heinrich 2003).  The primary 
emphasis of TQM addressed the role “customers” play in the business world.  “The 
consumer is the most important part of the production line.  Quality should be aimed at 
the needs of the consumer, present and future” (Deming 1986, 5).  By emphasizing the 
customer and improving quality at all levels of an organization, TQM promised to 
“transform” management systems in the American business world. 
 In developing TQM, Deming identified fourteen points that would help his efforts 
to transform American management systems.  Included in these fourteen points was a 
need for management to create a “constancy of purpose” (23) for employees, 
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emphasizing quality at all levels, promoting employee involvement, and focusing on 
constant improvement of products and processes to benefit the customer.   
 TQM took the business world by storm and was subsequently adopted by public 
sector agencies across all levels of government.  The way in which TQM was 
implemented varied, but the one common theme that emerged was the reliance upon 
performance measures by management to improve productivity within organizations.  
While it can be argued that the way TQM was actually implemented differed from 
Deming’s ideas, the TQM movement reinforced the ideals associated with measuring 
performance in the psyche of American management. 
 
The Reinvention Argument 
Calls to reinvent government grew in fervor with the Reagan Era, which brought 
with it taxpayer revolts, demands for downsizing government, and policies promoting 
devolution.  This resulted in a call from academics, politicians, and the general public to 
take a serious look at how government conducted its business.  Reinventing government 
emerged as a dominant theme, even a new paradigm, for improving government 
performance, while at the same time, reducing government programs and expenditures 
(Poister 2003). 
Osbourne and Gaebler’s (1993) Reinventing Government had a tremendous 
impact on government reform in the early 1990s.  They argued that in order for 
government to improve, it must adopt an entrepreneurial approach that would enable 
government workers to cut through “bureaucratic red tape” and to perform more 
effectively.   
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It is important to note that Osbourne and Gaebler’s reinvention approach viewed 
government as being inherently different from business.  While supportive of some 
private sector practices, Osbourne and Gaebler suggested that reinvention attempts must 
refocus on shifting government to an outcome-based perspective.  In order to accomplish 
this goal, government should use privatization, contracting for services, decentralizing 
decision making authority, and adopting performance measures to monitor performance 
(Osbourne and Gaebler 1993).   
Osbourne and Gaebler’s work heavily influenced Vice President Al Gore’s 
National Performance Review (NPR).  Commissioned by President Bill Clinton, Gore 
oversaw the reinvention efforts for the federal government.  The mission given to Gore 
was two fold: first, make government work better, and second, make it cost less (Gore 
1993). 
Reinvention relied upon methods of performance management as its primary tool 
(Gore 1993).  “Performance management programs should have a single goal: to improve 
the performance of individuals and organizations” (Gore 1993, 26).  The NPR went on to 
say that “agencies will gradually build performance information into their own budget 
guidance and review procedures, into their strategic and operational plans, and into 
revised position descriptions for their budget, management and program analysts” (Gore 
1993, 111). 
With the publication of the NPR, the Clinton administration embarked on a 
mission to reinvent the federal government using performance management as a key 
method to accomplish their goals.  During the proceeding years, the Clinton 
administration and Congress passed welfare reform legislation and adopted the 
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Government Performance and Review Act (GPRA) which required all federal agencies to 
identify specific performance measures for their organizations by September 30, 1997 
(Kravchuck and Schack 1996). 
Proponents of GPRA argued that it would provide an effective tool to assist 
Congress in obtaining additional oversight of the bureaucracy.  Supporters claimed that 
GPRA would ensure accountability to citizens and elected officials alike, in addition to 
helping instill a results oriented perspective for government (Mihm 2001).  Mihm 
contended that once results oriented government was implemented, employees in this 
type of system would “understand the importance and the connection between their 
individual performance and the organization’s success” (2002, 42-43). 
 
The New Managerialism 
 
 The call for reinventing government in the 1990s, combined with a reliance upon 
rationally-based economic theory, resulted in the development of a new managerial 
philosophy in the public sector known as both the New Public Management (NPM) and 
managerialism (Hughes 1994).  These terms will be used interchangeably in this study.  
Managerialism represented an ideology which praised the values associated with 
management itself (Pollitt 1993).  NPM assumed that individuals in government 
organizations were rational and would respond accordingly through proper performance 
monitoring by supervisors (Hughes 1994).  Essentially, NPM suggested that effective 
management, by itself, was capable of improving government programs and services 
(Pollitt 1993).   
 Hughes (1994) contended that NPM placed an emphasis on governmental results.  
In order to improve government results, managers adopting the NPM perspective rely 
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heavily upon developing flexible (i.e., nonbureaucratic) organizations, promoting 
performance monitoring systems, and bringing market forces to bear in government 
through the practices of contracting for services and privatization (Hughes 1994).  
Proponents of the NPM claimed that these approaches resulted in an improved and more 
economical government for citizens. 
While Pollitt (1993) has pointed out some inherent weaknesses with 
managerialism (including the lack of clearly established goals in public programs, and the 
model’s inability to deal with the conflicting values of fairness and equality in 
comparison with that of efficiency), this new managerial philosophy has developed into 
what  Rosenbloom (2002) has called the dominant managerial approach in public 
administration today.  It appears as if the field’s love affair with performance monitoring 
is here to stay. 
In conjunction with the growing popularity of performance monitoring and 
incentive plans, it is important to note that the child support program at the national level 
has enamored itself with these practices.  Chapter 3 provides a detailed history of the 
development of the child support program during the past thirty years.  Special emphasis 
is placed on how the program has used a combination of performance management 
techniques and the use of incentives, to dramatically emphasize the importance of 
performance  at the state and local levels of government.  In turn, this emphasis on 
performance allows states to draw additional federal funding for good performance as 
well as the possibility of penalties for poor performance levels. 
How successful the reinvention effort is remains to be seen.  While some are 
critical of the reinvention developments in the field of public administration (Moe 1994; 
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Nathan 2001; Radin 2002), it seems as if the proposals initiated with PPBS have come 
full circle.  Contemporary public administration relies heavily upon quantitative measures 
as the basis for improving results, performance, and accountability.  Performance 
management is presented as a uniquely qualified means to solve many of government’s 






















DEFICENCIES WITH PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
 
AND INCENTIVE SYSTEMS 
 
 The reasons given for implementing performance management systems fall into 
two broad categories:  first, the values associated with efficiency, and, second, to exert 
more control and accountability over public programs.  This chapter focuses on the latter. 
It explores the literature associated with bureaucratic control through performance 
management and how the use of incentives attempts to “reign in” the bureaucracy. 
 Brehm and Gates (1997) suggested that one body of literature provides an 
underlying foundation for explaining how the use of performance management and 
incentives affect subordinates and superiors within contemporary organizations.  This 
literature employed an economic perspective that suggested that individuals are 
ultimately self-interested and act in a rational manner to fulfill their own needs (Downs 
1967).  Assuming that subordinates are ultimately self-interested, one can rationally infer 
that they will only carry out the wishes of others if properly induced into acting according 
to their superior’s wishes.  Principal-agent theory has built upon this notion and has 
attempted to develop a model which explains how superiors (i.e., principals) can exert 
control over subordinates (agents).   
 
 





 Rational actor models hinge upon the idea that individuals will almost always act 
in a manner that benefits (or in the verbiage of economists, “maximizes”) their own self-
interest (Brehm and Gates 1997; Downs 1967; Miller 1990).  Because it is assumed that 
individuals will act rationally, developers of rational-actor models make the broad claim 
that they offer a robust approach that can be used to predict numerous types of behavior. 
 Economists (in addition to other social scientists) developed principal-agent 
models to describe the relationship that exists between superiors and subordinates in a 
number of fields, including public management (Arrow 1985; Lynn 1996; Pratt and 
Zeckhauser 1985).  Specifically, principal-agent models rely heavily upon the notion of 
incentives, inducements, and punishments as motivating factors in controlling 
subordinate behavior.  The result of such systems is a model which creates “linear, 
hierarchical, top-down” relationships that act as a constraint upon subordinate behaviors 
and actions (Feldman and Khademian 2002, 543-44). 
 Superiors in principal-agent relationships act as the principal.  Principals, in 
general, have a given set of preferences regarding some type of activity that they would 
like to see implemented.  Since principals typically do not have the time, resources, or 
even knowledge to complete these tasks, they must rely on subordinates (agents) to carry 
out these assignments on their behalf.  Under such relationships, the principal’s primary 
duty is to establish a system and design “incentives such that the agents find it in their 
own interests to take the best possible set of actions (from the principal’s perspective)” 
(Miller 1990, 325). 
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 While principals may establish these systems, they are inherently reliant upon 
agents to carry out their wishes.  Under such relationships, agents are viewed as having 
their own distinct preferences and other self-interests that may differ from the preferences 
of principals (Arrow 1985; Brehm and Gates 1997; Hammond and Miller 1985; Lynn 
1996; Miller 1990).  As such, lower-level subordinates have the potential to wield a great 
deal of power and influence in principal-agent relationships (Mechanic 1962).   
 Because these differences among preferences persist, the primary duty of the 
principal is to create a situation where the preferences of agents come into line with those 
of the principal.  According to principal-agent theory, the best way to do this is through 
the development of a contractual type relationship which relies heavily upon the notion of 
inducements to control and direct subordinate behavior and actions (Wood and Waterman 
1994).  In terms of this study, the child support program in the United States relies 
heavily upon performance measures created by Congress and the Office of Child Support 
Enforcement (OCSE) (the principals) which act as a constraint on state and local 
programs’ (the agents) collective behavior. 
For nearly two decades economists have claimed that their models are robust and 
predictive in nature given the assumptions of rationality and utility-maximization.  While 
their assertions may be true (again, given their limited characterization of human nature), 
a growing body of literature has emerged which criticizes the applicability of principal-
agency theory in a number of substantive areas.   
 
Weaknesses of Principal-Agency Theory 
 
The first of these criticisms relates to issues of hidden or unobservable actions 
(Lynn 1994).  Lynn found that a significant problem in principal-agent relationships is 
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“securing reliable task performance from agents” (1994, 115).  Lynn goes on to suggest 
that agents can engage in behaviors or activities that principals fail to observe.  While 
principals, in their efforts to control agent behavior, seek to minimize these situations, 
they continue to persist.  The result is that principals cannot possibly observe all activities 
of their agents due to cost restraints (Brehm and Gates 1997), the difficulty associated 
with monitoring certain activities (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985), and the general 
limitations in rewards that principals can offer agents (Arrow 1985).   
A second problem with principal-agency relationships according to Lynn is that 
information asymmetries exist where agents, by the nature of their work, are placed in 
positions to know more about their work than do their principals (Lynn 1994).  These 
information asymmetries result in potential disruptions to the power structure implicit 
between principals and agents.  Where principals have been viewed as being in control, 
agents are in the position of having more information available to them and may use it to 
their advantage (Brehm and Gates 1997). 
A consequential third problem is that issues pertaining to trust between principals 
and agents are frequently problematic.  Miller (1990) claimed that principal-agency 
relationships tend to focus on agent activities that are easy to observe.  In establishing an 
incentive system based on observable actions, agents are left in the potentially precarious 
position of being held accountable for things that are outside of their control.  “When this 
occurs, the principal and the agent can only contract for outcomes which may be jointly 
determined by the agent’s actions and some external random variable[s]” (Miller 1990, 
329). 
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The result of these types of situations is an agent blaming her performance on 
factors falling outside of her direct control.  The principal, who is placed in a position of 
not knowing for sure, may not believe the agent and suggest she is shirking her 
responsibilities.  In the end, neither the principal nor agent trust each other leaving both 
parties in a worse position (Miller 1990). 
A fourth problem with principal-agency models is that they present situations 
where agents are placed in the position where they may manipulate outcomes to benefit 
themselves (Hammond and Miller 1985).  It is important to recognize that the incentive 
to manipulate outcomes is likely the result of the three previous criticisms (hidden 
actions, information asymmetries, lack of trust) associated with principal-agent 
relationships.  While principals can attempt to create situations where manipulation is 
less likely, agents frequently will find themselves in a position where they can inherently 
improve their situations vis a vis their principals.  This criticism poses serious questions 
for the validity associated with contemporary incentive systems. 
Stone provided some additional insight into why agents may be willing to 
manipulate outcomes.  While numerical analysis represents the predominant mode of 
implementing control in principal-agent relationships, Stone has noted that measuring 
only represents “one of many ways to describe” social phenomena (2002, 163).  Stone’s 
perspective of measurement in contemporary policy analysis provides a useful construct 
from which to view performance management systems in the public sector. 
According to Stone, the use of numbers as a measurement device is not as 
unbiased as many would like to think.  Stone argued that numbers are used strategically 
by individuals or organizations in an effort to promote specific perspectives.  As such, 
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numbers are used symbolically as a storytelling device concerning problems and possible 
solutions.  “Numbers … are measures of human activities, made by human beings, and 
intended to influence human behavior” (Stone 2002, 177). 
Using numbers as a foundation for measuring schemes results in four identifiable 
outcomes that fundamentally question the objectivity frequently attributed to the use of 
quantitative methods.  First, whenever numbers are used, a conscious decision must be 
made about what counts and what does not (Stone 2002).  Those who make these 
decisions must construct various classification schemas in deciding where variables fall 
and how they will ultimately be counted.  The result is that boundaries must be created so 
decisions can be made about what is included and excluded.  In other words, “counting 
always involves deliberate decisions about counting as” (Stone 2002, 164). 
As a result, the decision of what counts and what does not entails a second 
problem—ambiguity.  While many might make the assumption that the use of numbers 
results in less ambiguity, Stone contended, “Ambiguity—the range of choices in what to 
measure or how to classify—always lies just beneath the surface of any counting 
scheme” (2002, 165).   
Stone’s suggestion, that numbers may be ambiguous, flies in the face of the 
intuitive notion that numbers imply precision and accuracy.  The result is that numbers 
and measurements result from a value-laden, heavily subjective, and inherently political 
process that defines how the numbers are constructed.  A careful analysis of the counting 
process reveals a less than objective perspective on the use of numbers and measurement 
systems.   
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A contemporary example of some problems with measuring is that public schools 
are now required to report progress on student performance under the guidelines of the 
No Child Left Behind policy initiative.  While at first glance this seems fairly easy to 
accomplish, difficult questions begin to emerge.  For example, should the scores of 
mentally challenged students be included in the school totals?  What about the scores of 
students who speak English as a second language?  Decisions on what counts and what 
does not has a dramatic impact on final scores depending upon how different schools 
include these groups of students in their respective counting schemes. 
Third, by measuring something, one implies a need for action (Stone 2002).  Why 
would something be measured if it did not warrant being monitored in the first place?  
The simple act of finding a way to measure something suggests it is important enough to 
be measured.  In addition, measurement also implies that a problem (or potential 
problem) may exist and that a solution is available to remedy the problem.  The success 
of any given solution requires adequate measurement to be able to demonstrate that the 
solution was an effective antidote to the problem. 
Once a measurement has been introduced, it implies that individual or 
organizational behavior is being monitored.  The fourth impact of measurement is that 
people, both individually and organizationally, respond to being measured (Stone 2002).  
“Measurement, like a mirror, triggers the natural desire to look good.  People want to 
conform to their own ideals as well as to general social values.  Measurement provokes 
people to ‘play the role’ and to present themselves as they want to be seen” (Stone 2002, 
178).  Stone identified this phenomenon of responding to measurement as reactivity. 
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Reactivity is an important component of the measuring process.  The entire 
philosophy of performance management is to improve performance through measuring 
activities and setting goals to increase individual and organizational achievement.  
Designers of performance management systems fully expect people to react to being 
measured and to improve their own performance.  “People change their behavior in 
response to being measured, and the changed behavior leads to results that are actually 
different from what they would have been without the measure” (Stone 2002, 180). 
While people may want to look good when being measured, it is important to 
consider that self-image is not the sole factor influencing behavior in measurement 
systems.  A fifth result of measurement is the role inducements play in the measurement 
process.  According to Stone, inducements rely heavily on the carrot-stick approach.  
Inducements can be viewed as either a reward (positive inducements) or as punishment 
(negative inducements).  “Every reward contains an implicit or potential penalty of 
withdrawal, and every penalty short of death contains an implicit reward of cessation” 
(Stone 2002, 265). 
When an inducement is offered to someone, their reactivity level to the 
measurement can be greatly influenced beyond that of just simply looking good.  “When 
people are measured … something more than their self image and their desire to please is 
on the line; their fate is at stake” (Stone 2002, 179-80).  Many performance management 
systems rely on inducements as an enforcement mechanism to alter behavior.  As a result, 
performance measures can be viewed in both positive and negative perspectives.  When 
so much is at stake, Stone has suggested that people “have a strong incentive to 
manipulate measures” to improve their own position and standing (2002, 180).   
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If Stone’s theory is accurate, a serious dilemma is raised concerning the 
objectivity of performance measurement systems.   
Understanding reactivity is so important … because, unlike deliberate 
falsification of numbers, it is an inextricable feature of social 
measurement.  Moreover, reactivity violates the canons of good scientific 
practice, on which all statistical reasoning is based.  Scientific method 
assumes a strict separation between the observer and the observed.  The 
subject of measurement should never measure himself or herself.  To do 
so would be the essence of subjectivity, and scientific measurement 
pursues the ideal of objectivity, where neither the subject nor the observer 
has incentive or opportunity to manipulate the way a measure appears. 
(Stone 2000, 180) 
 
Stone’s framework provides a useful perspective on the impact of measurement 
and performance management systems.  In addition to Stone’s critique of the use of 
numbers, others have noted that performance management can contribute to 
dysfunctional organizations (Bouckaert 1995), “gaming the system” (Poister 2003), and 
even organizational cheating (Bohte and Meier 2000). 
 These issues lie at the heart of understanding the development of the child support 
incentive program in the United States.  Chapter 3 details the history of the program 
relative to its emphasis of performance management and the development of a 













THE CHILD SUPPORT INCENTIVE PROGRAM 
 
Child support, until the mid 1970s, was largely considered a private matter left to 
be resolved between parents and the state or local court systems (Sorenson and Hill 
2004).  As previously mentioned, this “private” child support system was one that hinged 
upon judges making determinations regarding child and spousal support for both 
divorced and never-married parents and their children.  A primary problem inherent with 
this private system was its requirement of hiring attorneys in an attempt to obtain court-
ordered child support (Garfinkel et al., 1998).  This system resulted in a haphazard and 
inequitable allocation of child support for families throughout the country. 
The problem of children not receiving support from parents became more 
apparent over time.  By 1970, one child out of eight was living in a family headed by a 
single mother (Huang et al. 2004).  In a related trend, the amount of public dollars being 
spent on welfare tripled between the years of 1955 and 1975 (Garfinkel et al., 1998).  
Policy experts found that single-parent families were severely at risk for living in poverty 
and depending entirely upon the nation’s welfare system for daily sustenance.  The early 
emphasis of the child support program focused on using child support to help offset the 
costs associated with the nation’s public assistance program.  The emergence of the 
nation’s “public” child support system culminated in 1975 when Congress narrowly 
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passed Title IV-D of the Social Security Act which established the nation’s first 
comprehensive child support system (The history of child support and its partners, 2003). 
This chapter provides an overview of the nation’s child support program and its 
subsequent development during the past thirty years.  While its beginnings were modest, 
it has emerged as a major policy component in the nation’s welfare system.  Congress 
expanded the program in 1984, 1988, and most significantly in 1996 with the passage of 
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).   
Each of these acts added programmatic elements in an effort to make the child support 
program more effective and efficient (The history of child support and its partners, 2003).  
Most importantly, for this study, are the culminating changes brought with the passage of 
the Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998 which established the system’s 
current incentive program.  The following pages will provide background on this 
important legislative initiative. 
 
The Social Security Amendments (1975) 
 
 Until the passage of the Social Security Amendments in 1975, the nation’s child 
support program was essentially a private program administered by parents and their 
interactions with the state’s various court systems (Sorenson and Hill 2004).  As the 
number of children residing in single-parent households increased, pressure mounted by 
women’s groups for government to do something about the growing problem of children 
not being supported by absent parents, usually fathers (Garfinkel et al., 1998).  The 
culmination of this pressure, in addition to the realization that child support could be used 
to offset some of the costs associated with welfare programs, led to the narrow passage of 
the Social Security Amendments in 1975 which created the modern child support system. 
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 Specifically, Title IV-D of the Social Security Act required all states to establish 
an independent organization to oversee child support collections for families receiving 
Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) (The history of child support and its 
partners, 2003).  This landmark legislation created the federal Office of Child Support 
Enforcement (OCSE) to oversee the implementation of the child support program by the 
states and authorized the federal government to pay three-fourths of the bill associated 
with start-up costs for the program (Garfinkel et al. 1998; The history of child support 
and its partners, 2003).  The states were given these funds to help “locate absent parents, 
establish paternity, establish child support orders, and obtain child support payments” 
(Huang et al. 2004, 109). 
 While the creation of OCSE and the IV-D program was initially controversial, 
Congress soon realized that in order for the child support program to move forward, it 
needed additional powers and authority to become more effective.  By 1984 when 
President Ronald Reagan signed The Child Support Enforcement Amendments, both the 
House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate unanimously passed the legislation 
demonstrating a desire for the child support program to become more aggressive than it 
had been in the past (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1984). 
 
The Child Support Enforcement Amendments (1984) 
 
 The Child Support Amendments made four significant changes to the child 
support program.  First, and foremost, the 1984 legislation expanded the child support 
program and its services to both AFDC recipients as well as nonwelfare families (The 
history of the child support program and its partners, 2003).  Upon passage of the 
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amendments, the nation’s child support program and its services became available to 
anyone in need, regardless of their involvement with the welfare system.   
The second important emphasis of the 1984 law was the change in the 
requirement for states to find ways to expedite the establishment of child support and 
paternity (The history of child support program and its partners, 2003; Garfinkel et al. 
1998).  In its annual report to Congress, OCSE reported that in 1981, more than 8.1 
million women were raising children alone.  Of those, only 4 million had established a 
child support obligation (United States Department of Health and Human Services 1984).  
Child support experts began to place emphasis on the importance of establishing paternity 
and child support orders quickly so that financial support could begin as soon as possible 
for parents and children in need. 
Third, the new legislation required states to adopt standardized child support 
guidelines in an attempt to reduce the inconsistent way in which child support orders 
were established.  These inconsistencies in ordered child support amounts were typically 
the result of differences in judicial philosophy being applied in different judicial 
jurisdictions (Huang et al., 2004).  For the first time in the program’s history, states 
would be required to develop a standardized methodology in the way its judges 
determined what a child support obligation would be.  This would prove to be an 
important first step in standardizing the process used for establishing child support orders 
throughout the country and eliminating biases that had previously existed in the way 
these support amounts were determined. 
The fourth change that the 1984 legislation brought about was a number of new 
enforcement techniques to be utilized by the states.  The most important of these new 
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enforcement methods was the mandate that states must begin implementing immediate 
income withholding for all child support delinquencies in excess of thirty days (Sorensen 
and Hill 2004).  Under this new provision, employers were required to withhold child 
support directly from the noncustodial parent’s wages.  Second, states were required to 
establish processes to withhold state tax returns from noncustodial parents who were 
delinquent in their child support obligations (The history of child support and its partners, 
2003).  This change provided states with an additional tool to collect monies owed by 
delinquent noncustodial parents by applying it to past-due child support arrearages owed 
to either the State or the family.  Finally, states were required to adopt “long-arm” 
provisions to make it easier to collect child support across state lines (Garfinkel et al. 
1998). 
The changes emerging from the 1984 legislation represented an important step in 
increasing the necessary tools to effectively collect child support by the nation’s IV-D 
agencies.  These changes represented the foundation of the IV-D program.  However, 
future amendments to the nation’s child support program would be required to further 
enhance collection efforts on the part of state agencies and the OCSE. 
 
The Family Support Act (1988) 
 
 Four years elapsed before Congress and the president were willing to enhance the 
child support program again.  An important aspect of the 1988 legislation involved the 
mandate for states to begin developing fully automated computer information systems 
(The history of child support and its partners 2003).  The new legislation built upon 
standards that were first introduced with the Child Support Amendments in 1984. 
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 One of the most significant changes of the Family Support Act was the mandate 
for states to implement mandatory income withholding, regardless of whether a 
delinquency existed, by the year 1994 (Huang et al. 2004).  Income withholding, as 
Sorenson and Hill (2004) noted, has been child support enforcement’s most effective 
collection tool to date.  The ability for states to use income withholding has been a 
critical addition in helping IV-D agencies increase child support collections throughout 
the nation and has been used increasingly since 1988. 
 In addition to the income withholding provisions, the Family Support Act also 
enhanced the 1984 Child Support Amendments by requiring states to adopt provisions 
making their child support guidelines presumptive (United States Department of Health 
and Human Services 1989).  Under this new requirement, noncustodial parents would 
need to make significant arguments as to why their child support amounts should deviate 
from the guideline amount.  If a judge allowed a deviated amount to be entered in a court 
order, the new legislation required the judge to enter specific findings of fact explaining 
why the deviation was warranted. 
 With the ascent to power of Newt Gingrich and the “Contract with America” 
Republicans in 1995 came new and fervent promises to reform the nation’s welfare 
system.  Congress and the president would once again look to the child support program 
as a central player in moving people from welfare to work.  The Personal Responsibility 
and Work Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) ended the AFDC program and 
replaced it with a broad block grant entitled Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF).  The child support program also underwent serious enhancements as it played 
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an important role in providing monetary support for families moving from welfare toward 
self-sufficiency. 
 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
 Reconciliation Act (1996) 
 
 President Bill Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) into law on August 22, 1996.  While much of the 
attention related to PRWORA focused on reforming the nation’s welfare program, 
significant changes were also made to the child support system.  Under PRWORA, child 
support enforcement was viewed as an integral component of welfare reform that could 
provide financial stability for families thus keeping at-risk families from using 
government assistance. 
 PRWORA enhanced the child support system in a number of important ways.  
First, employers were required to report all newly hired employees to IV-D agencies who 
would maintain the data as part of a State Directory of New Hires (SDNH) and transmit 
this information to the National Directory of New Hires (NDNH).  This data base would 
be made available to all of the nation’s IV-D agencies for the purposes of collecting child 
support (Sorenson and Hill 2004). 
 In a related matter, states were also required to pass the Uniform Interstate Family 
Support Act (UIFSA) which made the enforcement of child support obligations uniform 
across state boundaries (The history of child support and its partners 2003).  UIFSA was 
viewed as a critical component to solving a persistent problem of enforcing child support 
orders when the noncustodial parent resided in another state. 
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 Third, PRWORA placed an increased emphasis on establishing paternities for 
out-of-wedlock children born in hospitals.  States were required to change their laws to 
allow for paternity acknowledgement forms to be filled out and signed by parents while 
they were in the hospital and then forward the signed documentation to the states’ offices 
of vital records. 
 Fourth, a number of new enforcement remedies were added to the child support 
arsenal.  These additional tools included provisions to deny passports to individuals who 
were more than $5,000 delinquent in child support, increased emphasis of income 
withholding (United States Department of Health and Human Services 1996; The history 
of child and its partners 2003), and mandated the requirement for states to establish 
centralized State Disbursement Units (SDUs) from which all child support payments 
would be sent (United States Department of Health and Human Services 1996). 
 Finally, PRWORA paved the way for the development of a contemporary 
incentive program.  Like much of the rhetoric surrounding the “reinventing government” 
movement of the 1990s, PRWORA adopted an outcomes-based approach in many of its 
programs, including child support.  While the full-blown incentive program would not be 
officially sanctioned until 1998, PRWORA implemented audit criteria which would focus 
on child support outcomes.  These incentives provided an additional revenue stream to 
support the IV-D program and would reward child support programs for good 
performance (United States Department of Health and Human Services 1996).    
 PRWORA fundamentally changed the way in which human service and welfare 
agencies conducted their business.  While debates continue regarding the success of the 
welfare reform initiative, researchers have found that the nation’s child support program 
    
 
35
played an important part in reducing the number of individuals receiving TANF benefits 
under the PRWORA initiatives (Huang et al. 2004; Mead 2005).   
 
The Child Support Performance and Incentive Act (1998) 
In an attempt to bolster the contributions of state child support agencies, 
policymakers in Congress were quick to adopt the Child Support and Performance 
Incentive Act (CSPIA) of 1998 to offer state child support programs the ability to earn 
additional funds for good performance.  Undoubtedly influenced by the Government 
Performance and Review Act (GPRA), the newly proposed child support incentive 
program moved beyond the scope of simple cost-effective measures and boldly embraced 
the contemporary movement associated with performance management and carrot-stick 
incentive structures (Cassetty and Hutson 2005). 
The CSPIA directly resulted from the PRWORA changes in 1996 which required 
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), in conjunction 
with state IV-D directors, to develop a new performance-based incentive system 
(Gardiner et al. 2003).  The CSPIA constructed a new child support incentive system for 
state IV-D agencies which would be based on performance in four key performance areas 
in addition to the previously used cost-effectiveness measure.  In order to ensure that 
states did not cheat in reporting their progress on these standards, a comprehensive data 
reliability audit would be conducted of state systems to ensure that the data maintained 
and entered into state IV-D computer systems was accurate and complete. 
In establishing the CSPIA, Congress guaranteed a capped pool of money would 
be available beginning in federal fiscal year 2000 and continue through 2008.  The 
amount of incentive money each state would receive was granted on the basis of how 
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each state did on the performance measures and was ultimately calculated on a weighted 
basis in terms of the total amount collected by the IV-D agency (Gardiner et al. 2003).  
Each state IV-D agency is required to submit annual reports (the OCSE 157, and the 
OCSE 396) to the federal office which is used as the basis for granting the states’ 
incentive awards. 
As mentioned previously, the CSPIA created five key performance standards that 
would be used as the basis for rewarding state IV-D agencies.  The standards chosen were 
a reflection of OCSE’s strategic plan and emphasized key areas of the child support 
program.  Additionally, the CSPIA adopted a mechanism through which OCSE could 
impose penalties on child support agencies for failing to meet minimum standards in 
these areas of performance.  The penalties associated with poor performance resulted in a 
penalty against the states’ grant under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF).  The first year generally resulted in a penalty of one percent of the state’s TANF 
grant and continued up to 5 percent unless the state demonstrated improvement in the 
problem area.  
 The first performance measure was the Paternity Establishment Percentage (PEP).  
A fundamental aspect of the child support program revolves around establishing paternity 
for children who are born to unmarried parents.  In developing this standard, OCSE and 
the nation’s IV-D directors agreed to offer each state the opportunity of choosing one of 
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 A state choosing the IV-D paternity standard (45 CFR 305.2(a)(i)) is measured on 
the number of paternities that are established within cases assigned to the IV-D agency.  
Under this performance standard, the IV-D agency is only responsible for establishing 
paternities over which it directly has control.  The IV-D PEP measure is determined by 
the following formula: 
 
 
The Total Number of Children in the IV-D caseload in the Fiscal Year, or at the option of 
the State, as of the end of the Fiscal Year, who were Born Out-of-Wedlock with Paternity 
                                                 Established or Acknowledged                                  
The Total Number of Children in the IV-D Caseload as of the end of the preceding Fiscal 
Year who were Born Out-of-Wedlock 
 
 
 Conversely, if a state chooses to employ the statewide paternity standard (45 CFR 
305.2(a)(ii)), the IV-D agency is held responsible for establishing paternities statewide—
even for situations where the agency may not have a case.  Under this scenario, child 
support agencies are required to work with birthing facilities in the state to ensure that 
paternity establishment processes are completed and reported to the states’ vital record 
agencies.  The statewide PEP measure is determined by the following formula: 
 
The Total Number of Children Born Out-of-Wedlock and for Whom Paternity has not           
              Been Established or Acknowledged During the Fiscal Year     
The Total Number of Children Born Out-of-Wedlock During the Preceding Fiscal Year 
 
 
 The minimum standard that states must maintain, without imposition of a penalty, 
for both of the PEP standards is a 90 percent score.  Gardiner et al. (2003) reported that 
there appears to be no difference in state performance between the two PEP options; 
however, they have noted that the IV-D measure seems to be improving more rapidly 
than is the statewide measure. 
 The second incentive measure monitors the number of cases within the IV-D 
program that have an actual child support order in place (45 CFR 305.2(a)(2)).  Again, 
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this standard is directly related to OCSE’s strategic plan and is a necessary element if 
child support is to be paid to custodial parents on behalf of their children.  The minimum 
performance standard is that 40 percent of cases in the IV-D caseload must have a child 
support order.  This standard is determined by the following formula: 
   
The Number of IV-D Cases with Support Orders During the Fiscal Year 
Total Number of IV-D Cases During the Fiscal Year 
 
 
 The percentage of current child support paid (45 CFR 305.2(a)(3)) is the third 
incentive measure created by the CSPIA.  This measurement directly concerns itself with 
the collection of support that is owed on a monthly basis.  Again, this measurement is 
related to the OCSE’s strategic plan to provide regular (i.e., monthly) financial support to 
families.  States are expected to maintain a minimum percentage of 40 percent to avoid 
penalty.  This standard is computed by the following formula:  
 
  The Number of Dollars Collected for Current Support in IV-D Cases 
Total Dollars Owed for Current Support in IV-D Cases 
 
 
 The fourth measurement relates to the number of past-due collections (45 CFR 
305.2(a)(4)) brought in by IV-D agencies.  This measurement attempts to capture the 
amount of collections child support programs are successful in collecting that are overdue 
or late.  This measurement is computed by the following formula: 
 
 
Total Number of IV-D Cases Paying Toward Arrears 
Total Number of IV-D Cases with Arrears Due 
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Finally, the CSPIA continues the tradition of monitoring IV-D agencies’ cost 
effectiveness ratios (45 CFR 305.2(a)(5)).  Simply put, this measure provides a return-on-
investment approach that attempts to demonstrate the ratio that comes about by looking at 
the IV-D agency’s expenditures and the amount of collections that are made by that IV-D 
agency.  The measurement is determined by the following formula: 
 
Total IV-D Dollars Collected 
Total IV-D Dollars Expended 
 
 
The federal government requires state IV-D agencies to submit to regular data 
reliability audits.  Using information contained on the OCSE 157 report, auditors monitor 
state systems for completeness and accuracy.  In order to conduct these audits, Gardiner 
et al. (2003) reported that OCSE requires at least 120 cases from each state to conduct 
their analysis.  Once completed, states must pass their data reliability tests at a 95 percent 
confidence interval to avoid penalty.  Should a state be unable to meet the 95 percent 
threshold, it is considered exempt from participating in the incentive program for the area 
in which it failed.   
In sum, the CSPIA adopted a “carrot and stick” approach to the newly formed 
child support incentive system.  It is important to note that states that perform well on 
these measures can bring in additional revenues to support their respective programs. The 
opposite also holds true.  States that perform poorly, or that fail to pass the data reliability 
component, are penalized for their “inadequate” performance.  In theory, the child 
support incentive program provides a mechanism which acts as a constraint upon IV-D 
agency behavior at the state level and guides state efforts in key areas important to the 
federal government. 
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The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 
 
 An additional factor relevant to this analysis pertains to the passage of the Deficit 
Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005.  The legislation, which passed by the narrowest of 
margins, brought serious budgetary cuts to nearly all of the nation’s domestic programs.  
The child support program was not exempt from these budgetary shortfalls.  Specifically, 
the cuts associated with the child support program focused on the child support incentive 
plan.  While the incentive program was left intact, one critical component was removed.  
When the CSPIA was initially adopted, it was accepted that states would be able to draw 
down their incentive award, which counts as program revenue for the state.  The state 
was then authorized to draw down federal match dollars (66 percent), on the amount of 
incentive that was earned by the state. 
 The Deficit Reduction Act ended the practice of drawing down the additional 66 
percent match on incentive payments beginning October 1, 2007.  The cuts were justified 
by some on the basis that state practices of receiving federal funds from the incentive and 
then matching those with the IV-D match rate of  66 percent (also federal funds) 
constituted another example of states engaging in “double dipping.”   
 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
 
Since the passage of the Deficit Reduction Act, concerted efforts within the child 
support community have tried to get Congress to reinstate the federal match on incentives 
earned.  The recent passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), 
or commonly referred to as the “stimulus package” temporarily addressed this issue.  The 
ARRA allows, on a temporary basis, states to match their incentive dollars with the 
federal match.  States can match their earned incentive with federal match funds (66 
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percent) for a two-year timeframe that ends in 2010.  After that date, the prohibition of 
matching funds on incentives will be reinstated. 
The economic crises of the past several years have resulted in a direct impact on 
child support programs within the states.  While the full impact of these cuts remain to be 
seen, there is no doubt that state programs who have worked toward improving their 
performance in the incentive program are the most likely to be hurt under the new 
funding limitations imposed by the DRA.  The temporary reinstatement of federal 
matching dollars will help, but the cuts that result from this drop in federal funding pose 
significant challenges for cash-strapped state programs. 
 This chapter has provided details pertaining to the development and 
implementation of an incentive program for the federally mandated child support 
program.  Thus far, the analysis has focused on the factual and theoretical aspects of this 
program.  The question remains as to how effective the incentive program has been in 
acting as a constraint on child support agencies and how it has affected street-level child 
support workers and their day-to-day activities.  The following chapters will present 












 The previous chapter provided a detailed history of the development of the child 
support incentive program in the United States.  While states have used this incentive 
program as a means to increase funding for their respective child support programs, little 
research has examined the influence this program has on street-level child support 
workers.  This dissertation explores the impact of the child support incentive program for 
front-line child support workers and to further entertain the conditions under which these 
workers provide child support services to the public.  Principal-agent theory provides the 
theoretical framework from which this analysis is conducted. 
 
Research Questions  
 
The first research question inquires into the influence the child support incentive 
program has on child support agencies.  Does the incentive program shape individual 
behavior for street-level child support workers?  Do the daily activities child support 
workers engage in support the key tenets of the incentive system?  Do workers 
consciously complete daily tasks that serve to increase individual and organizational 
performance in the child support incentive system? 
If the incentive system acts as a constraint upon individual activities, the second 
research question delves into the dark side of performance management.  Do child 
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support workers feel undue pressure to increase performance in the areas covered by the 
incentive system?  Principal-agency theory suggests that agents (in this case front-line 
staff) may have some inherent interests to engage in manipulation or to “game the 
system” in an attempt to improve their standing within their organization.  In some 
instances, these activities are justified as they may benefit the organization in comparison 
with other child support programs from around the country. 
In order to answer these questions, child support workers from four different 
states were surveyed about their daily work activities and their general attitudes about the 
pressures associated with working in a child support agency.  A copy of the survey 
instrument is found in Appendix B.   
Because some of the information obtained from the surveys was somewhat 
delicate, the four selected states remain anonymous and are referred to as: “State A,” 
“State B,” “State C,” and “State D.”  Appendices A-1 through A-4 contain state profile 
information, including performance data and other important characteristics for each 
state.  A brief summation of each of the states’ characteristics and performance under the 
child support incentive program is conducted in the following pages. 
 
State Programs Participating in the Study 
 
 The participating states were selected based upon each state’s receipt of federal 
incentive funds.  In order to determine the amount of incentives each state received, an 
examination of all state programs was conducted using the federal fiscal year 2005 
incentive statistics.  Each state program was ranked by three factors: 1) incentive dollars 
per case, 2) incentive dollars per full-time employee (FTE), and 3) incentive dollars as a 
percent of total collections.  Once each of the three rankings was figured, an average  
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score was computed for each state.  After reviewing the list of states, four state programs 
agreed to allow their employees to participate in the survey.  Table 4.1 provides the 
ranking data used to select the states. 
 Based on the criteria used, State “A” is considered a “high incentive state,” State 
“B,” a “medium-high” incentive state, State “C,” a “medium-low” incentive state, and 
State “D,” a “low” incentive state.  All four of the state programs are state administered.  
No county-based programs agreed to participate in this study. 
 The four states varied in size.  For instance, the number of FTEs ranged from 247 
to over 1,600 for one of the states.  Not surprisingly, there was a wide range in terms of 
the number of cases each state was assigned (ranging from a low of 45,000 to a high of 
377,000) and the amount of dollars collected  (ranging from a low of $94 million to a 
high of $613 million) for FFY 2005.   
 Each state program participating in this study agreed to allow their employees to 
participate.  The survey was administered between the months of October and December 
2007 to over 1,300 child support workers in the four programs.  While response rates 
varied from state to state, the total response was 54.5 percent.  The following pages 
provide a brief description of the four state programs that participated in this study. 
 
Table 4.1 State incentive rankings 
             
                       State       Incentives by    Incentive    Incentive by      Average 
                                          Caseload        by FTE       Collections         Rank 
             
A 7 12 11 10.000 
B 17 14 4 11.667 
C 26 13 21 20.000 
D 25 39 22 28.667 
             




State A was the smallest of the child support programs that participated in this 
study.  State A had a relatively small number of employees (247) and a modest caseload 
consisting of about 45,000 cases.   Based on the report data, it appeared that the number 
of FTEs and the number of cases remained relatively constant throughout the years.  With 
that said, total collections for State A dropped in FFY 2006 for the first time since the 
inception of the child support incentive system in 1999. 
The performance measures for State A demonstrated good and improving 
performance in the five incentive areas.  The only potential blemish in State A’s 
performance history pertained to the state’s Paternity Establishment Percentage (PEP) 
score.  State A dropped below the 90 percent threshold in 2001 but has shown constant 
improvement since that time.  It appears that the improvement was enough to avoid 
federal financial penalties to the state. 
State A represented the lowest amount of participation in the survey of the states 
participating in the study.  Only 27 members of State A’s staff responded to the survey.  
While it was nearly impossible to determine the response rate to the surveys (repeated 
efforts were made to contact the state about the number of individuals given the survey, 
but no response could be obtained), the response rate was estimated to be somewhere 





 State B was the most unique of the four states participating in this study as it was  
the only one that had a couple of counties which elected to manage their own child 
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support program.  Those surveyed for this study worked for the state program and not the 
counties’.  Of 185 total child support workers, 100 responded to the survey (resulting in a 
54 percent response rate).  State B’s total number of child support employees (including 
state and county) has remained constant, albeit with a slight upward trend.  The state’s 
reports also demonstrated a consistent drop in the number of cases since FFY 1999. 
 The state’s performance has been consistent as well.  Like State A, State B has 
experienced problems attaining its PEP score.  Unlike all of the other states, however, 
State B used the IV-D measurement instead of the statewide measure.  The state’s woes 
in this area began in FFY 2000 when the state earned a PEP score of 61.5 percent, well 
below the 90 percent threshold.  In addition to the poor number, the state failed its data 
reliability audits in the paternity establishment area.  While the state improved its score 
enough in years 2000-2001 to avoid any further financial penalties, it did not achieve the 
90 percent level until 2003.  The data show constant improvement in each subsequent 
year. 
 In addition to the data reliability failure in the PEP score, State B also failed a 
data reliability audit for payments toward arrears in 2001.  Failing the data reliability 
review results in the state’s inability to participate in incentive funding for that particular 
area.  In sum, it appeared that State B received some penalties toward its incentive, 





 In State C, 530 employees received the survey and 369 responded to it.  The 
response rate of 69.7 percent was the highest among the states participating in this study.  
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State C reported 650 FTEs in FFY 2006, which represents a significant increase over past 
years.  In addition, State C has experienced a significant increase in its caseload since 
1999.  Likewise, State C has seen increases in its total collections. 
 In terms of performance, State C has shown constant improvement in its five 
incentive areas.  Like States A and B, State C has also struggled achieving its PEP score.  
In FFY 2000, State C’s PEP score was 81.4 percent.  The state improved this number to 
86.3 percent the following year, but it dropped again (80.7 percent) in FFY 2002.  It is 
unclear at this time if State C received a financial penalty for this failure to meet the 90 
percent performance level.  Again, the incentive problems experienced by State C are 
beginning to fade due to the length of time in which the infractions occurred. 
 
State “D” 
 State D also reported high response rates for the survey.  Four hundred and thirty 
two potential respondents were given the survey and 263 responded for a response rate of 
60.9 percent   State D appeared to have experienced some dramatic decreases in the 
number of FTE’s in FFY 2006 (930 down from 1, 041 in FFY 2005).  The caseload in 
State D has experienced a steady downward trend, decreasing from a high of 390,000 
cases in FFY 2002 to nearly 368,000 in FFY 2006.  While caseloads and staff have 
dropped, State D has experienced increases in collections culminating in an eight-year 
high of almost $550 million in FFY 2006. 
 State D follows a pattern similar to that of the other states in this study.  Its 
performance has steadily increased, but once again, the state has experienced some 
problems with the PEP score.  Initially, State D reported a PEP score of over 91 percent 
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in 2000.  A year later, however, the state reported a score of 86.70 percent followed the 
next year by a 79.7 score in 2002.  The 2002 score should have resulted in a financial 
penalty to the state.  FFYs 2003 and 2004 showed modest increases in State D’s PEP 
score culminating in the state achieving 92.5 percent in FFY 2005. The state has 
remained above the 90 percent threshold ever since. 
 In summary, each of the states participating in this dissertation exhibits some very 
clear similarities.  Each has experienced some historic problems in achieving the 
minimum standards for the PEP score, although these are probably starting to fade in the 
institutional memory of each of the programs and its staff.  In all of the other areas, the 
states have all maintained or improved upon each of the five incentive measurements. 
 Along with those similarities, there also appeared to be some dramatic departures 
between the states.  States B and C have both experienced significant staffing increases, 
while State A has remained steady and State D actually dropped.  In addition, State C was 
the only state to see significant increases in its caseload.  All of the other states 
experienced decreases in the number of cases assigned to the child support program.  
Finally, States B, C, and D all experienced increases in collections.  State A experienced 
a drop in collections in FFY 2006, which dramatically departs from collections 




 Based upon the construction of the dependency on incentives (see Table 4.1), 
hypotheses can be constructed to test the underlying research questions posed by this 
study.  The first of these hypotheses dealt directly with the issues of the federal incentive 
amounts each state receives.  It was reasonable to expect that workers from high 
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incentive states, who theoretically are more dependent upon incentive dollars, would 
identify tasks pertaining to the achievement of performance goals at higher rates than 





 where > indicated state workers having more knowledge of the federal child support 
incentive and its correspondingly acted as a constraint on worker tasks: 
 A second hypothesis, more central to the overall goal of this research was also 
constructed regarding the specific issue of organizational cheating by child support 
workers.  I hypothesized that the more dependent a state was on incentive dollars, the 











 In order to gather the data necessary for this study, permission was obtained from 
each selected state’s IV-D director to interview front-line staff regarding their knowledge 
of the federal incentive system.  Specific questions were tailored to measure the extent 
that day-to-day work was constrained by the federal incentive program.  The survey, 
found in Appendix B, explored child support workers’ opinions related to the pressures 
they may or may not feel to improve performance in the areas identified in the incentive 
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program.  The survey was administered to all child support workers in each state program 
that agreed to participate in the study.   
 The introduction of the survey explained that the purpose of the study was to 
“research the attitudes, beliefs, and practices” of child support workers from around the 
country.  In addition, the introduction explained that workers’ responses would remain 
anonymous, and they were free not to participate in the study.  It also explained that their 
response to the survey served as their consent to participate in the study.  The 
introductory statement emphasized that workers’ responses were important to improving 
the nation’s child support program and would bolster survey response rates.   
 The questionnaire was delivered to recipients using an online survey source.  This 
method of data gathering posed a number of distinct advantages over traditional (paper-
based) survey administration.  First, the online survey provided a simple way to deliver 
the survey to a relatively large number of potential survey respondents.  More 
importantly, all of the child support workers who participated in the survey had access to 
the Internet to accomplish their job duties.  As a result, delivering the survey through 
online means made sense since all of the potential survey respondents had the means to 
participate, if they wished, and none were excluded because they were unable to access 
the survey instrument.  Finally, the online survey was a reasonably inexpensive method 
to administer the survey to a large and geographically diverse number of individuals. 
 The online survey was designed to allow respondents to skip questions and each 
question provided respondents the opportunity to respond with a “don’t know/choose not 
to answer” type of response.  If a respondent chose not to respond to a question, they 
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were allowed to continue with the survey and to complete as many or as few of the 
questions as they wished. 
 The survey began by asking respondents some generally simple questions 
(Questions 1-4) regarding their work history and experience within the child support 
program.  These questions were asked early in the survey to assure the respondents that 
the questions discussed pertained to their jobs and were relatively simple to answer.   
The next series of questions (Questions 5-9) inquired into the level of knowledge 
front-line employees have about the child support incentive system.  The responses to 
these questions allowed for further analysis of worker compliance within the overall 
incentive structure and acted as an independent variable concerning the second research 
question.  
 Incidents of organizational cheating, because of their nature, are not readily 
observable.  With that said, one of the primary purposes of this study was to gauge the 
degree of organizational cheating that occurs within child support agencies.  The 
measures established for organizational cheating in this study (Questions 13-15) acted as 
the dependent variable for the purposes of analysis.  These questions, by design, 
attempted to measure the degree of organizational cheating from a couple of different 
perspectives. 
 For example, Question #13 attempted to measure the degree to which 
organizations developed specific strategies to improve performance in key areas.  
Respondents were asked to indicate their opinion to the following question: “My 
organization spends a lot of time developing strategies to increase performance in key 
areas.”  This question was quite subtle, but it attempted to identify how workers viewed 
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organizational attempts to improve performance.  It is important to note that the 
responses to this question did not directly ask about the issue of cheating.  Rather, it was 
an attempt to measure the level of organizational influence from a worker’s perspective.  
 Question #14 was more pointed.  It asked respondents to identify if “It is possible 
to take actions in my caseload that will artificially inflate my individual performance 
levels.”  Again, this question, by design, did not imply worker culpability.  Rather, it 
simply inquired into the possibilities of cheating within their workplace. 
 Question #15 asked respondents to answer: “I am aware of others in my 
organization who take actions to artificially inflate their individual performance levels.” 
Again, I did not ask respondents whether they specifically engaged in such activities, but 
the question attempted to focus workers on what was actually going on in terms of 
cheating within the organization while not specifically implicating themselves. 
 Finally, Question #16 bluntly asked workers if “In the past year, I have felt 
pressure from someone in my agency to manipulate my caseload to improve 
performance.”  Again, workers did not indicate if they succumbed to these supervisory 
demands, only if they felt this type of pressure from their managers. 
 The responses to these four questions provided the foundation for this research.  
They are important elements in determining the degree of organizational cheating that 
may, or may not, exist within the child support agencies participating in this study. 
 A primary goal of this study was to find a remedy to offset the likelihood of 
organizational cheating.  In order to accomplish this goal, survey questions were designed 
to measure a number of additional variables that may help identify factors that led to 
increases in organizational cheating.   
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 Bohte and Meier (2000) identified a number of variables that potentially acted as 
motivation for organizations to engage in organizational cheating.  One of these variables 
was poor organizational performance.  Poor performance may provide justification for 
some to engage in questionable activities to improve performance.  Poor performance 
may be determined by an agency’s inability to meet minimum performance standards or 
in a decline of performance over time.  The performance data gathered from each of the 
states determined if performance problems existed in the past, and if these performance 
woes acted as a precursor for propensities to engage in cheating. 
Additionally, Bohte and Meier suggested the likelihood of organizational cheating 
increased when task demands at the individual, team, and organizational levels were 
overwhelming.  Peterson et al. (1995) developed a validated scale that measured a 
number of role-related items.  These scales were used in the survey instrument for this 
research.  The first of these scales measured the worker’s sense of work overload and 
stress (Questions 21-25 of the survey).  In theory, if workers felt extreme pressure 
because of overwhelming workloads, they might be more likely to engage in questionable 
behaviors to overstate their individual performance.  The survey posed several questions 
about the degree to which workers felt capable of accomplishing the necessary daily tasks 
that would result in successful job performance. 
In a similar vein, if task demands were such that workers felt pressure to 
manipulate outcomes, a common strategy was to engage in “creaming” or selecting easy 
cases to work (Blau 1955; Wilson 1989).  Working cases that are more likely to result in 
payments may be a strategic device workers employ in order to meet the demands 
managers and the organization place on them to perform.  Working “easier” cases in lieu 
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of the more difficult ones was a mild form of cheating but was one that may be relatively 
common among caseworkers.  Survey questions (Questions 11-13) inquire about the 
emphasis workers place on finding effective strategies to improve performance. 
The survey also asked child support workers if they felt others monitored their 
work product within their respective organizations.  The survey instrument adopted a 
validated scale developed by Oldham and Cummings (1996) which measured worker’s 
perceptions of organizational supervision.  This scale was created by combining 
questions 17, 34, 35, 36, and 37 in the survey.  These questions asked a battery of 
questions focused on the individual worker (or agent) in relation to their supervisors (or 
principals).  As principal-agency theory suggests, it is imperative for principals to 
implement processes to monitor the behavior of agents.  As demonstrated in Chapter 3, 
where monitoring is considered to be inadequate, principal-agent theory suggests that 
agents will pursue their own self-interests.  While all forms of cheating are probably 
viewed in negative terms by organizations, the degree to which performance is monitored 
likely varies between and among child support agencies.  Workers may be more willing 
to engage in forms of cheating if they felt that monitoring was done haphazardly.  
Therefore, the survey attempted to assess employee attitudes concerning how closely 
their work product was monitored. 
A number of additional independent variables were measured by the survey.  
First, the instrument measured the degree of employee job satisfaction (Questions 38-39), 
by using a scale developed by Cammann et al. (1983).  Notions of role ambiguity 
(Questions 25-29) and role conflict (Questions 30-32) were investigated by using scaled 
questions developed by Peterson et al. (1995).  Each of these variables was important, 
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because they provided insights into the clarity child support workers had in regard to their 
job.  The concept of role conflict was one that could be potentially important as the 
possibility of receiving competing task demands might have impeded individual decision-
making for child support workers. 
Finally, the survey explored how well employees understood how their employer 
measures performance.  Williams and Levy (1992) developed a series of questions that 
measured employee understanding of performance appraisal systems (Questions 41-44).  
The survey concluded by asking some additional general demographic questions 
(Questions 45-50).  Survey respondents were also given an opportunity at the end of the 
questionnaire to answer an open-ended question that asked, “Is there anything else you 
would like to share regarding your work performance and experience?” 
The survey tool described in this chapter was the basis for the analysis that 
follows.  The questions were designed for specific purposes that would allow further 
exploration of the research questions which lie at the heart of this study.  The following 
chapters focus on the degree to which child support workers understand the incentive 
system structure, and whether they were willing to engage in “cheating” behaviors to 






















MEASURING THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE CHILD SUPPORT  
 
INCENTIVE PROGRAM BY FRONT-LINE WORKERS 
 
This research investigates the impact that incentive systems have on incidents of 
organizational cheating in the substantive area of child support enforcement.  In order to 
gather relevant data, I interviewed child support professionals from four state level 
programs using a battery of questions pertaining to their workplace.  Some of the 
questions posed to workers related to their individual knowledge of the child support 
incentive system.  This chapter seeks to arrive at a conclusion concerning the individual 
knowledge and understanding of the child support incentive system by front-line child 
support workers. 
State child support programs can earn additional funding for performing well in 
five specific categories (see Chapter 3 for more detail).  It is reasonable to hypothesize 
that state workers coming from “high” incentive states may have more knowledge of the 




 A couple of different methods could be used to arrive at an answer to the question 
of how knowledgeable staff is about the incentive plan.  The simplest way was to ask 
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them about it.  With that said, it may not have been reasonable for front-line staff to know 
specifically whether an incentive program existed.  Given that line of reasoning, the 
survey instrument measured specific job-related tasks that correlated with four of the five 
incentive measures. 
 In order to establish front-line worker knowledge of the incentive program, child 
support workers were asked three specific questions pertaining to their organization’s 
involvement in an incentive program.  The first question asked respondents whether their 
organization received additional funding for “outstanding organizational performance.”  
The overwhelming response from all workers, as presented in Table 5.1, was “I don’t 
know.”  
The responses to this question demonstrated an overall low level of worker 
knowledge that their programs could earn additional funding for performance.  While 
responses from State A (the high incentive state) suggested that a third of respondents felt 
their program could earn additional funding, two-thirds said either their state did not earn 
additional funds, or they did not know if additional funds could be earned.  Conversely, 
State D (the low incentive state) had the second highest correct response (21.07%) to the 
question.   
 Given the responses to this question, it appeared there is quite a bit of uncertainty 
among respondent state workers about their organization’s ability to earn incentive 
dollars.  Over half of all respondents indicated that they did not know if additional funds 
were available and almost 28 percent incorrectly stated that their program could not earn 
incentive dollars for performance. 
A second question asked survey respondents about the possibility of penalties for 
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Table 5.1.  Responses of state’s ability to receive incentive funding 
 
 
State Yes No Don’t Know Total 
A       9   33.33%      5    18.52%    13   48.15%     27   100% 
B     10   10.99%    45    49.45%    36   39.56%     91   100% 
C     69   19.60%    93    26.42%  190   53.98%   352   100% 
D     51   21.07%    56    23.14%  135   55.79%   242   100% 
Total   139   19.52%  199    27.95%  374   52.53%   712   100% 
 
poor performance.  The question inquired about the possibility of penalties in the event 
their organization failed “to perform in certain areas.”  When couched within these 
“negative terms,” the overwhelming response from respondents was that their agency 
could be penalized.  The survey results for this question are presented in Table 5.2. 
Over three-fourths of all of those surveyed (75.89%) indicated that it was possible 
for their organization to be penalized for poor performance.  Only 2 percent said that their 
organizations were not susceptible to financial penalties, while a significant portion 
(21.84%) said that they did not know if their organization was subject to penalties.  This 
pattern holds true when the data are examined at the state level.  The only minor 
exception to these findings was in the response-set from State B participants.  Fewer 
respondents indicated that their state could be penalized (66.30%), while more said their 
state could not be penalized (6.52%).  In addition, a higher proportion of State B 
respondents indicated that they did not know if their agency could be penalized (27.17%) 
than in the other participating states. 
 Substantively, more respondents in all states recognized that their agencies could 
be punished financially for poor performance than knowing that their agency could earn 
additional incentive funding for meeting, or exceeding goals.  The responses suggested 
that the majority of respondents from all states seemed confident that negative incentives 
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Table 5.2.  Responses for possibility of penalties for poor performance. 
 
 
State Yes No Don’t Know Total 
A     21   77.78%      0      0.00%      6   22.22%     27   100% 
B     61   66.30%      6      6.52%    25   27.17%     92   100% 
C   265   76.59%      7      2.02%    74   21.39%   346   100% 
D   188   78.33%      3      1.25%    49   20.42%   240   100% 
Total   535   75.89%    16      2.27%  154   21.84%   705   100% 
 
could result for poor performance, but were unaware of the reality that IV-D child 
support programs were capable of earning extra monies for good performance.  
 A third question asked respondents if their state had ever experienced financial 
penalties for poor performance.  As Chapter 3 detailed, the IV-D child support program 
provides several mechanisms through which states can be penalized for not meeting 
performance standards in the five incentive areas.  Once again, the data demonstrated that 
most respondents did not know if their state has ever been penalized.  The results for this 
question are displayed in Table 5.3. 
 The responses to this question suggested a lot of ambiguity existed among 
workers concerning their understanding of the possibility of penalties being levied 
against state child support programs.  Three-fourths of the respondents indicated that they 
did not know if their program received any financial penalties.  These results were 
remarkably consistent among the respondents from each state. 
In order to assess the accuracy of this question, the responses need to be 
compared to any instances where the participating state may have experienced actual 
financial penalties for failing to meet incentive standards.  While “official” data could not 
be obtained from the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement regarding this matter, 
the data presented in the Appendices regarding each state’s performance levels suggested 
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Table 5.3.  Responses of whether organizations have been penalized. 
 
 
State Yes No Don’t Know Total 
A       2     7.41%      5     18.52%    20   74.07%     27   100% 
B     13   14.13%    12     13.04%    67   72.83%     92   100% 
C     56   16.09%    27       7.76%  265   76.15%   348   100% 
D     18     7.47%    44     18.26%  179   74.27%   241   100% 
Total     89   12.57%    88     12.43%  531   75.00%   708   100% 
 
 
that in only one case, State D, was there ever a likelihood of financial penalties being 
levied against the state.  Once again, the survey results indicated a general finding of low 
worker knowledge about the incentive system. 
 One possibility for this low-level understanding of the incentive system by 
workers may have been that workers did not identify with an “incentive system” but 
would identify work tasks that directly pertain to that system.  As a result, a series of 
questions in the survey asked respondents to rank eleven task-oriented items, five of 
which were the actual incentive items, on a scale of one to ten, with one representing a 
low priority for the agency and ten being high.  The purpose of these questions was to 
measure the degree of importance front-line workers assigned to incentive and 
nonincentive tasks.  The results of the analysis suggested that front-line workers hardly 
distinguished between incentive and nonincentive tasks.  This finding provides further 
evidence that front-line workers do not understand the federal incentive system.  These 
data are found in Table 5.4. 
In order to determine the overall understanding of front-line workers of the 
performance incentive items, an additive scale was created to compare the knowledge of 
incentive and nonincentive work tasks.  These scales were created by adding the sum of 
all worker responses to the five incentive and six nonincentive tasks.  The range for  




Table 5.4.  Responses comparing incentive and nonincentive tasks. 
Incentive Items Nonincentive Items 
Paternity Establishment   IV-A Collections     
State Mean Median Standard Deviation State Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation 
A 10.11 11 2.19 A 10.56 11 1.121 
B 9.88 11 2.524 B 8.75 10 3.156 
C 8.85 11 3.332 C 8.53 10 3.392 
D 9.99 11 2.2 D 8.86 10 2.971 
Order Establishment  Customer Responsiveness 
State Mean Median Standard Deviation State Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation 
A 9.93 11 2.218 A 10.2 11 1.581 
B 10.05 11 2.279 B 9.82 11 1.986 
C 8.97 11 3.266 C 9.68 11 2.157 
D 10.19 11 1.862 D 10.03 11 1.859 
Current Support     Cost Controls     
State Mean Median Standard Deviation State Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation 
A 10.37 11 1.944 A 7.24 9 3.876 
B 10.23 11 1.955 B 6.49 8 4.166 
C 9.68 11 2.368 C 6.87 8 4.032 
D 10.07 11 1.866 D 7.55 9 3.614 
Past Due Collections  Caseload Size    
State Mean Median Standard Deviation State Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation 
A 10.15 11 2.013 A 6.64 7 3.451 
B 9.62 11 2.340 B 5.7 5 3.652 
C 9.05 10 2.610 C 5.6 5 3.631 
D 9.55 10 2.211 D 6.35 6 3.653 
Cost Effectiveness   Total Collections     
State Mean Median Standard Deviation State Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation 
A 7.15 8 3.613 A 10.44 11 2.022 
B 6.43 7.5 4.000 B 10.16 11 2.089 
C 6.57 7 3.825 C 9.33 11 2.777 
D 7.78 9 3.536 D 9.91 11 2.145 
        Federal Timeframes   
     
State Mean Median Standard Deviation 
     A 10.44 11 0.961 
     B 9.62 11 2.557 
     C 9.19 11 2.868 
        D 9 10 3.122 
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incentive items was 5-55 and nonincentive items ranged from 6-66.  Once the additive 
value was constructed, a standardized score was figured by dividing the incentive scale 
score by 5 (the number of incentive tasks) and the nonincentive scale by 6 (the number of 
nonincentive tasks).  The results of this computation are presented in Table 5.5. 
At first glance, the construction of these scale items demonstrated a slight 
difference in the way front-line workers ranked incentive and nonincentive work tasks in 
importance.  The results clarified that most workers slightly identified incentive tasks as 
being more important than the nonincentive tasks.  These findings tended to support the 
general finding that most workers demonstrated little knowledge of the incentive system.  
It is also important to note that there was also very little difference between how the high 
incentive and low incentive state workers ranked these items. 
In looking at the individual items that made up the scale, it became apparent that 
caseworkers did not feel it was important for their organizations to keep caseload size to 
a manageable level.  This was the lowest of all of the ranked items and was not surprising 
given some of the comments survey respondents attached to their surveys.  In an effort to 
create a more balanced measure, a second incentive scale was created to remove the 
caseload question from the analysis.  These results, shown in Table 5.6, demonstrated an  
 
Table 5.5.  Standardized measures for incentive and nonincentive tasks. 
 
Incentive Items (Range 1-11) Nonincentive Items (Range 1-11) 
State Mean Median Standard Deviation State Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
A 9.541 10 1.678 A 9.253 9.667 1.503 
B 9.236 9.7 2.030 B 8.424 8.667 1.993 
C 8.619 9.1 2.337 C 8.199 8.500 2.076 
D 9.516 10.2 1.831 D 8.617 9.000 2.004 
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Incentive Items (Range 5-55) Adapted Non Incentive Scale (Range: 5-55) 
State Mean Median Standard Deviation State Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
A 47.7037 50 8.389 A  48.88 51 6.49564 
B 46.1778 48.5 1.015 B 44.8409 46 1.01 
C 43.0936 45.5 1.169 C 43.5917 45 1.05 
D 47.5809 51 9.153 D 45.3872 48 9.451 
 
almost indecipherable difference between the incentive and nonincentive task scales.  In 
other words, child support workers from all four state programs generally identified 
nearly all of the tasks as being “highly” important for their organizations. 
In sum, the results from this analysis do not support the hypothesis that workers 
from high incentive states would rank incentive tasks higher than nonincentive tasks.  As 
the data show, workers, regardless of their state performance on incentives, ranked both 
categories nearly equally.  Couple this finding with the results from the questions that 
inquired into the ability for state programs to earn additional funding for high 
performance; it was readily apparent that most child support workers do not have a 
general, let alone a detailed, understanding of the child support incentive program. 
This finding was surprising given how state programs that perform at high levels 
have become dependent upon these additional incentive dollars to bolster their programs.  
Principal-agency theory suggests it is rational for organizations to emphasize key 
performance areas, particularly where good performance in those areas can result in 
positive (in this case financial) outcomes for the organization.  In the four participating 
states, survey respondents did not rank incentive tasks in the way principal-agency theory 
would suggest.  While organizations might rely heavily upon these dollars, it does not 
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ASSSESSING ORGANIZATIONAL CHEATING 
 
 One of the key purposes of this study was to identify whether incidents of 
organizational cheating were higher among states drawing more incentive dollars.  The 
underlying theory suggests that state programs which draw more performance-based 
incentive dollars might be more inclined to engage in cheating-types of activities in order 
to facilitate the continued increase of incentive dollars to their programs.  According to 
principal-agency theory, agents might be willing, in some situations, to bend the rules in 
order to maximize their own profitability. 
 In order to assess this important question, survey respondents were asked a 
battery of questions pertaining to their behaviors concerning cheating.  Careful attention 
was paid to construct questions in a way that would answer the question without posing 
any risk to the survey participants.    The survey questionnaire and research methods were 
consistent with the policies of the University of Utah’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
and received IRB approval prior to gathering any data. 
 Before addressing the questions related to cheating, it was important to assess 
other activities that were perceived to be related to the issue of organizational cheating.  
First, survey respondents were asked how they felt their own individual performance 
impacted overall organizational performance.  It seemed reasonable to expect higher 
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levels of self-reported incidents of individual contributions in high incentive states 
compared with low incentive states. This expectation was not met in this study.  Table 6.1 
demonstrates that the vast majority of survey respondents (regardless of their state’s level  
of incentive dollars) felt that their performance had an impact on their organization’s 
performance.  Ninety percent of respondent’s either “strongly agreed” or “agreed” that 
their individual performance mattered in terms of organizational performance.  There 
appeared to be wide consensus among respondents that individuals play an important part 
of organizational performance.  
A second series of questions inquired into the role strategy played in improving 
performance.  In terms of organizational cheating, it seemed reasonable to expect that 
state programs that spent more time strategizing might find themselves with higher 
instances of organizational cheating.  Two questions were asked about the degree to 
which workers strategize to improve performance with co-workers and supervisors.  An 
additional question asked survey respondents to rate whether their organization spent a 
lot of time trying to develop strategies to improve performance.  Using these questions as 
a foundation, an additive scale was constructed to measure the total amount of 
strategizing going on within the organizations.  Again, I hypothesized that high incentive 
states would strategize at higher levels than low incentive states. 
 
Table 6.1.  Responses for impact of personal performance on organizational performance. 
 
State Strongly   Agree Agree 
Neither Agree 
or Disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree Total 
A   13   48.15%    13   48.15%    1   3.70%    0   0.00%    0   0.00% 27 
B   46   50.55%    38   41.76%    6   6.59%    1   1.10%    0   0.00% 91 
C 116   33.72%  179   52.03%  29   8.43%  12   3.49%    8   2.33% 344 
D 103   44.02%  120   51.28%    9   3.85%    1   0.43%    1   0.43% 234 
Total 278   39.94%  350   50.29%  45   6.47%  14   2.01%    9   1.29% 696 
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 Overall, survey respondents indicated moderate levels of strategizing with co-
workers, but higher levels with their supervisors.  These findings were consistent at the 
state level as well.  As Tables 6.2 and 6.3 indicate, workers said they either strongly 
agreed or agreed that they spent time strategizing about performance with their co-
workers.  In total, nearly two-thirds (66 percent) of respondents indicated they spent time 
talking about performance strategies with their co-workers.  While there was some degree 
of variance between the states (State B being the highest at 86 percent and State C the 
lowest at 58 percent), the vast majority of responses suggested moderately high levels of 
co-worker strategizing. 
 The responses rose significantly, however, when respondents reported about 
strategizing with their supervisor.  Table 6.3 depicts an overall response rate of 75 
percent who either strongly agreed or agreed they spent time with their supervisors 
strategizing about their individual performance.  This finding is not surprising as a 
supervisor’s primary function focuses on the productivity of staff. 
Based on the underlying research hypothesis, I expected to see higher incentive 
states engaging in more strategizing between supervisors and staff.  The data presented in 
 Table 6.3 demonstrated consistent results between states concerning supervisor  
 
Table 6.2.  Responses for strategizing with co-workers to improve performance. 
 
 
State Strongly Agree Agree 
Neither Agree 
or Disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree Total 
A 7   25.93%    10   37.04%      6   22.22%   4   14.81% 0   0.00% 27 
B 28   31.11%    49   54.44%      9   10.00%   3     3.33% 1   1.11% 90 
C 48   14.04%  152   44.44%    90   26.32% 43   12.57% 9   2.63% 342 
D 60   25.32%  107   45.15%    54   22.78% 12     5.06% 4   1.69% 237 
Total 143   20.55%  318   45.69%  159   22.84% 62     8.91% 14   2.01% 696 
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Table 6.3.  Responses for strategizing with supervisors to improve performance 
 
State Strongly   Agree Agree 
Neither Agree 
or Disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree Total 
A    3    11.54%   16    61.54%     5   19.23%    1    3.85%    1     3.85%       26 
B   26   29.21%   47    52.81%   10   11.24%    4    4.49%    2     2.25% 89 
C   68   19.77%  173   50.29%   59   17.15%  34    9.88%  10     2.91%      344 
D   71   30.08%  116   49.15%   36   15.25%  10    4.24%    3     1.27%      236 
Total 168   24.17%  352   50.65% 110   15.83%  49    7.05%  16     2.30%      695 
 
 
strategizing.  The difference between the highest reported scores for supervisor 
strategizing ranged from 82 percent (State B) and 70 percent (State C).  While the data 
demonstrated that supervisors may spend a significant amount of time with staff 
strategizing, the results did not suggest that managers from higher incentive state spent 
more time with their staff in comparison with lower incentive states.   State A, the highest 
incentive state, reported a 73 percent score while State D, the lowest incentive state, 
reported 75 percent of respondents either agreeing or strongly agreeing they spent time 
with their supervisors in strategy sessions.  It appeared, based upon the responses, that 
child support supervisors from all of the participating states spent a significant amount of 
time developing strategies to improve performance with front-line workers. 
In contrast, a significant drop in respondents’ answers was found regarding the 
degree to which their organizations attempted to develop strategies for improving 
performance.  Again, it seemed reasonable to expect that higher incentive states would  
report higher levels of organizational strategizing than lower incentive states.  Table 6.4 
presents these data. 
Interestingly, State D, the lowest incentive state, reported the highest response 
rate for organizational strategizing with 68 percent stating they either strongly agreed or 
agreed that their organization spent a significant amount of time trying to find ways to  
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Table 6.4.  Responses for organizational strategizing to improve performance. 
 
State Strongly   Agree Agree 
Neither Agree 
or Disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree Total 
A    2   8.00%     8  32.00%   8    32.00%  4   16.00%    3   12.00% 25 
B  13   15.12%   39  45.35% 18    20.93% 6    6.98%  10   11.63% 86 
C  31    9.37% 138  41.69% 79    23.87% 50    15.11%  33     9.97% 331 
D  57   25.45%   95  42.41% 48    21.43% 14      6.25%  10     4.46% 224 
Total 103  15.47% 280  42.04%  153    22.97% 74    11.11%  56     8.41% 666 
 
improve performance.  Conversely, the lowest reported incidents of organizational 
strategizing was State A (40 percent), the highest incentive state.  States B and C were 
somewhere in between ranking 60 percent and 51 percent, respectively. 
It consistently appeared that among the survey responses, most respondents 
strategized with their supervisors at higher levels than with co-workers.  In addition, the 
majority of respondents ranked their respective organizations consistently at lower levels 
for developing strategies to improve performance.  While the researcher expected to see 
differences between co-workers, supervisor, and organizations, it was somewhat 
surprising to find the low regard most workers reported for their organization’s efforts at 
finding ways to improve performance. 
More importantly, this finding suggests a problem with a primary assumption of 
this research concerning the notion that high performing organizations spent more time 
strategizing to improve their funding through the child support incentive system.  With 
that said, the data do not provide specific evidence contrary to the assumption regarding 
the way in which organizations may influence performance.  These results may suggest 
that lower performing organizations (such as State D in this study) may be spending more 
time strategizing on ways to improve performance in order to obtain a larger piece of the 
available incentive pie that may result from increased performance.   
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These findings, while in no way definitive, do pose some interesting questions 
regarding the way workers perceived the role their organizations played concerning 
developing and implementing strategies to improve performance.  The results of these 
data suggest that the majority feel their supervisors are important players in strategizing 
in comparison to co-workers and especially their organizations. 
A second series of questions posed to survey respondents concerned the issue of 
cheating.  The issue of cheating was operationalized through the development of three 
core “cheating” questions.  First, respondents were asked if it was possible to artificially 
inflate performance within their caseloads.  Second, participants responded to whether 
they were aware of others in their organizations who took actions to artificially inflate 
their performance levels.  Finally, respondents were asked if they felt pressure during the 
past year from someone in their organization to manipulate their individual performance.  
For each of these variables, it seemed appropriate to expect to find higher reported 
incidents of cheating in high incentive states. 
Concerning the first cheating variable, a plurality (36 percent) of all respondents 
either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the assertion that individuals could artificially 
inflate their performance.  The findings are presented in Table 6.5.  Nearly 30 percent of 
all respondents agreed or strongly agreed that performance levels could be inflated, while 
19 percent indicated they neither agreed nor disagreed with the claim.  Sixteen percent 
indicated that they did not know if performance could be inflated. 
In terms of the participating states, State B (47 percent) reported the highest 
agreement levels.  The other three states reported similar agreement scores with State C 
being the highest (30 percent), followed by State A (26 percent) and State D (22 percent).   
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Disagree/Disagree Don't Know Total
State A 7 25.93% 8 29.63% 11 40.74% 1 3.70% 27 
State B 42 46.67% 15 16.67% 20 22.22% 13 14.44% 90 
State C 102 29.65% 66 19.19% 134 38.95% 42 12.21% 344 
State D 53 22.46% 42 17.80% 87 36.86% 54 22.88% 236 
Total 204 29.27% 131 18.79% 252 36.15% 110 15.78% 697 
 
The state with the highest responses disagreeing with the claim that performance can be 
inflated was State A (41 percent).  States C and D reported 39 percent and 37 percent 
disagreement rates, respectively, followed by State B with 22 percent. 
My hypothesis suggesting that higher incentive states would report higher levels 
of possible cheating appears not to hold true.  With the exception of State B, a medium-
high incentive state, States A, C, and D all reported similar scores to each other.  Of 
particular note was the number who indicated they did not know if cheating was possible.  
There appeared to be a relationship between low incentive states reporting higher degrees 
of “don’t know” responses in comparison to higher incentive states. 
The second cheating variable asked if survey respondents knew of others within 
their organizations who artificially inflated their performance levels.  Table 6.6 presents 
these findings.  A plurality of responses (35 percent) either strongly agreed or agreed that 
they knew of someone engaging in cheating behavior.  Nearly a quarter of all respondents 
answered, “don’t know” to the question, while 21 percent either disagreed or strongly 
disagreed with the question.  Twenty percent were ambivalent toward the question. 
 With the exception of State A (22 percent), the research hypothesis suggesting  
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Disagree/Disagree Don't Know Total
State A 6 22.22% 7 25.93% 8 29.63% 6 22.22% 27 
State B 42 46.67% 14 15.56% 9 10.00% 25 27.78% 90 
State C 132 38.04% 78 22.48% 64 18.44% 73 21.04% 347 
State D 62 26.16% 41 17.30% 69 29.11% 65 27.43% 237 
Total 242 34.52% 140 19.97% 150 21.40% 169 24.11% 701 
 
that higher incentive states reported more incidents of cheating seemed to be consistent 
with the results from the survey.  State B (47 percent) reported the highest “agreement” 
score, followed by State C (38 percent), and State D (26 percent).  State A reported the 
lowest agreement scores with 22 percent.  The “Don’t Know” responses were relatively 
equal between the responding states. 
The contrast between the results of the second and third cheating questions was 
very interesting.  While question two essentially asked respondents to report on behaviors 
from others in the organization, the third cheating question attempted to get at the 
respondents’ ideas of whether they themselves engaged in this behavior.  While the 
question did not directly ask workers if they participated in these types of behaviors, it 
asked respondents to indicate whether they felt pressure from someone in their 
organization to inflate their performance.  The results are presented in Table 6.7.  The 
overwhelming response from all states was “no.” 
Eighty-five percent of respondents said that they did not feel any pressure to take 
actions to artificially increase performance levels.  These ratings held relatively 
consistent between the states.  The highest percentage of “no” responses came from State  
 
    
 
73
Table 6.7.  Responses for workers feeling pressure to cheat (Inflate performance). 
 
 
  Yes No Don't Know Total 
State A   2   7.41%   22 81.48%   3 11.11% 27 
State B 15 16.48%   72 79.12%   4   4.40% 91 
State C 38 10.95% 289 83.29% 20   5.76% 347 
State D 14   5.93% 213 90.25%   9   3.81% 236 
Total 69 9.84% 596 85.02% 36   5.14% 701 
 
D (90 percent), followed by State C (83 percent), State A (81 percent), and State B (79 
percent). 
In conclusion, the vast majority of survey respondents from all four states 
generally acknowledged that their individual performance had an impact on their 
organization’s overall performance.  This finding suggests child support workers from the  
four participating states recognize that their individual contributions matter in terms of 
how well their overall organizational performance.  In contrast, however, the same 
workers generally do not feel that their organizations play a large part in providing 
guidance in terms of providing strategies for them to improve their performance.  Instead, 
workers reported they strategize with co-workers and supervisors at relatively high levels.  
This finding suggests that front-line workers may experience a disconnect in the way they 
view their organizational world in terms of their immediate supervisor and colleagues.  
By doing this, they appear to be somewhat oblivious to the nature of their organization as 
a whole that may have come about because of specialization and compartmentalization 
within the agency.  This finding challenges an underlying assumption of this work that 
organizations matter when it comes to influencing individual performance. 
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In terms of measuring cheating, the pluralities of responses suggested that 
cheating may exist, to some degree, in all organizations.  While respondents suggested: 1) 
it was possible to inflate performance levels, and 2) they knew of others who participated 
in these types of behavior, the overwhelming majority indicated that they, themselves, 
have not felt pressure to inflate performance.   These findings support the possibility that 
cheating does occur within child support agencies.  The following chapter explores these 








































PART ONE: INFLUENCING VARIABLES ON CHEATING-  
 
ANALYSIS FOR ALL SURVEY RESPONDENTS 
 
 The previous chapter provided an overview of the broad issues pertaining to 
organizational cheating.  The findings of that chapter suggested that the vast majority of 
child support professionals participating in this study did not feel that cheating was 
occurring within their organizations.  With that said, it is important to recognize that a 
minority of respondents reported that some degree of cheating did occur.   
This chapter focuses on whether several key variables effect organizational 
cheating.  This chapter begins this process by analyzing the data from all survey 
respondents in order to examine how cheating is related to variables identified as 
important in previous research.  Chapter 8, a companion to this chapter, continues the 






 From previous studies, I identified eight specific variables related, in some 
degree, with incidents of cheating.  These eight variables include: 1) poor organizational 
performance, 2) overwhelming task demands and stress, 3) strategizing and finding ways 
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to increase performance, 4) supervision and monitoring of employee behavior, 5) job 
satisfaction, 6) role ambiguity, 7) role conflict, and 8) the understanding of the agency’s 
performance appraisal system by staff.  Seven of these eight variables served as 
independent variables for this study (poor organizational performance was discussed in 
Chapter 6).  The survey instrument used to gather the data for this study measured these 
variables in an attempt to see how survey respondents’ answers related to their self-
reported incidents of cheating. 
 As Chapter 4 detailed, survey questions were constructed in a way to measure 
respondent’s opinions about these issues.  Once the data were gathered, scales were 
created using multiple questions as the basis to create a single variable for each of the 
seven independent variables.  While the number of questions for each variable differed 
(ranging from a low of two questions for the variable “job satisfaction” and a high of five 
for the variables “job stress” and “role ambiguity”), the basic method for constructing the 
surveys remained the same.  Additive scales were created using the responses to the 
questions.  Missing answers and “don’t know” responses were removed from the analysis 
as they provided no substantive value to the questions being asked.   
The majority of survey questions consisted of either five or seven-point Likert-
type responses.  For ease in analysis, responses to each of the questions pertaining to the 
seven independent variables were collapsed into three categories; “strongly agree/agree,” 
“neither disagree or agree,” and “strongly disagree/disagree.”  For example, the question 
related to job satisfaction asked survey participants to respond to the question:  “All in 
all, I am satisfied with my job.”  At this point, respondents could select from seven 
responses ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.”  In order to 
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accommodate the analysis of the data, responses indicating “strongly agree” and “agree” 
were collapsed into one response set, mid-range responses were collapsed, and “strongly 
disagree” and “disagree” responses were combined.  This process was repeated for each 
of the survey questions related to the seven aforementioned independent variables. 
Once this task was completed, scale items for each of the seven variables were 
constructed.  Scales were created by simply adding the scores from the questions used as 
the basis for the scaled item.  Using the job satisfaction scale as an example, the collapsed 
survey responses for two questions were used to create this scale item.  This resulted in a 
scale that had a response range of 2-6 (this was later recoded for a range of 1-5).  Once 
the scale was created, the scale was again collapsed into three categories: “strongly 
agree/agree,” “neither agree or disagree,” or “strongly disagree/disagree.”  This was done 
to increase the number of responses in each of the categories in order to meet some of the 
demands associated with the chi-square analysis which would be completed  The detail 
for each scale, including the questions used for the creation of the scales, is found in 
Appendix F. 
In terms of the dependent variable (cheating), two questions were used to measure 
the amount and types of cheating that might occur within the surveyed child support 
agencies.  The two “cheating” questions inquired into two different aspects associated 
with cheating.  The first explored the possibility of one’s ability to manipulate 
performance levels.  The second asked whether the respondent was aware of others in the 
organization who artificially inflated performance.  Due to ethical constraints, the survey 
was unable to ask respondents if they themselves participated in these questionable 
activities.   Table 7.1 provides the wording of these questions. 
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Table 7.1.  Survey questions pertaining to cheating 
             
13. It is possible to take actions in my caseload that will inflate my individual 
performance levels. 
14. I am aware of others in my organization who take actions to inflate their 
individual performance levels. 





 In looking at the results for all of the survey respondents, bivariate analysis was 
used to compare the seven independent variables against the two definitional constructs 
associated with cheating.  Tables 7.2 and 7.3 present the findings of this analysis for the 
dependent variables for the possibility of cheating and awareness of others cheating. 
 When the dependent variable of cheating was operationalized as “possibility of 
cheating,” the bivariate analysis suggested statistical significance for the variables of role 
conflict (χ2 = 18.672) and job stress (χ2 = 9.907) (see Table 7.2).  These findings allowed 
rejection of the null hypothesis which suggested that no relationship existed between the 
variables.  The summary measures are presented in Table 7.2 for each of the seven 
variables.  Similarly, Table 7.3 presents the bivariate results which demonstrated 
statistically significant relationships for the variables for role conflict (χ2 = 22.758) and 
job satisfaction (χ2 = 14.760) when the dependent variable was operationalized as 
“awareness of others cheating.”  The following sections present the findings for each of 
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Table 7.2.  Summary of association of independent variables on the possibility of 
cheating 
             
 
     Independent Variables                      N        Chi-Square   Probability     Tau-b 
             
Role Conflict 541 18.672 0.001 0.02 
Job Stress 527 9.907 0.042 0.02 
Job Satisfaction 571 6.441 0.169 n/a 
Supervision 560 8.16 0.086 n/a 
Role Ambiguity 552 2.342 0.673 n/a 
Strategizing 560 4.151 0.386 n/a 
Knowledge of Performance 
Appraisal 520 2.046 0.360 n/a 
             
 
 
Dependent Variable #1: Possibility of Cheating  
 
 As mentioned previously, two of the seven independent variables were 
statistically significant for the dependent variable measuring the possibility of cheating.  
The tau-b measure of association for both variables of role conflict and job stress was .02,  
which indicated a moderately weak relationship between the variables.  It is important to 
recognize that the plurality of responses indicated respondents either strongly disagreed 
or disagreed with the possibility of cheating occurring within their respective 
organizations.  With that said, a small number of respondents disagreed with the claim 
that cheating does not occur.   
This analysis explores the interrelations of the statistically significant variables 
with the operationalized definitions used for cheating.  While the relationships were not 
particularly strong, they do provide additional detail into how these variables associate 
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Table 7.3.  Summary of association of independent variables on others cheating 
             
  Independent Variables                        N         Chi-Square    Probability     Tau-B 
             
Role Conflict 555 22.758 0.00 0.000 
Job Satisfaction 600 14.760 .005 0.001 
Role Ambiguity 580 2.731 0.604 n/a 
Supervision 582 5.363 0.252 n/a 
Job Stress 548 7.822 0.098 n/a 
Strategizing 577 6.047 0.196 n/a 
Knowledge of Performance 
Appraisal 
531 2.258 0.323 n/a 
             
 
 
Role Conflict and the Possibility of Cheating 
 
 The independent variable measure for role conflict was created from responses to 
three questions (see Table 7.4) designed to measure the level of conflict respondents 
experienced in completing their job duties.  According to principal agent theory, role 
conflict should be minimized in order for agents to perform their duties more efficiently 
and effectively.  The underlying hypothesis here suggests that as role conflict increases 
among child support professionals, so would reports of cheating.   The measure for role 
conflict was collapsed into three specific categories which are defined here as low role 
conflict, medium role conflict, and high role conflict.  Bivariate analysis was conducted 
which examined the relationship between these two variables and are presented in Table 
7.5. 
  Respondents who reported low levels of role conflict also tended to report low 
levels of cheating.  This particular finding falls in line with the underlying hypothesis, 
which suggests that as one’s level of role conflict decreases so does corresponding  
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Table 7.4.  Survey questions pertaining to role conflict 
              
31.  I often get involved in situations in which there are conflicting requirements. 
32.  I receive incompatible requests from two or more people. 
33.  I have to do things that should be done differently under different conditions. 
             
 
notions of cheating.  Likewise, the analysis found that those indicating medium levels of 
role conflict reported relatively similar levels of cheating (36.2, 29.6, and 34.2 percent, 
respectively).   
However, the distribution of responses for those reporting high levels of role 
conflict was bimodal in nature.  Forty-two percent of respondents reporting high levels of 
role conflict reported low levels of cheating while 41 percent reported high levels of 
cheating.  Only 17 percent of high role conflict respondents reported medium levels of 
cheating. 
Principal-agent theory suggests feelings of role conflict among agents results in 
situations where instructions from principals may not be as clear as they should otherwise 
be.  This idea falls in line with the prospect that if role conflict is minimized for agents 
(by principals), the agents’ understanding of tasks are more clearly defined.  As tasks are 
more clearly defined, and roles in accomplishing these tasks are better understood, the 
need or desire for cheating would decrease.   
The data, however, do not support this expectation.  The analysis finds that the 
theoretical expectations seem to hold true for those reporting low levels of role conflict.  
It does not hold true, however, for those reporting medium and high levels of role 
conflict.  Among moderate and high role conflict respondents, the responses indicate  
participants were almost as likely to report low levels of cheating as they were high 
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Table 7.5.  Effect of role conflict on possibility of cheating for all states 
             
 
                                                                                   Role Conflict 
 
     Possibility of Cheating         Low                Medium              High               Total 
             
 
Low 65 54.6% 88 36.2% 75 41.9% 228 42.1% 
Medium 23 19.3% 72 29.6% 31 17.3% 126 23.3% 
High 31 26.1% 83 34.2% 73 40.8% 187 34.6% 
Total 119 100% 243 100% 179 100% 541 100% 
 
             
χ2 = 18.672 tau b = .02 
p = .001 
 
 
levels. This finding is significant in that the data presented split results among the 
distribution of responses for high and medium role conflict respondents and their 
corresponding views of cheating. 
 
Job Stress and the Possibility of Cheating 
 In addition to role conflict, job stress was also found to be statistically significant 
when compared with the variable for the possibility of cheating.  Job stress was 
constructed based on five questions in the survey (see Table 7.6).  The method explained 
earlier in this chapter was used to create the scaled item for job stress.  As in the previous 
analysis involving role conflict, bivariate analysis was used to compare the scaled 
measurement for job stress (independent variable) with the dependent variable for 
possibility of cheating.  Like the analysis for role conflict, similar 
distributions emerged for each of the categories for job stress, particularly with those 
indicating high levels of job stress.  The data are presented in Table 7.7. 
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Table 7.6.  Survey questions pertaining to job stress scale 
             
21.  There is a need to reduce some parts of my job. 
22.  I feel overburdened in my job. 
23.  I have been given too much responsibility. 
24.  My workload is too heavy. 
             
 
Those reporting low levels of job stress also tended to report low levels of 
cheating.  For those indicating more moderate levels of job stress, they also tended to 
report low levels of cheating, although the percentage reporting high levels of cheating 
slightly increased.  Among those indicating high levels of stress, however, a divergence 
in responses between low and high levels of cheating begins to emerge.  Among those 
reporting high levels of job stress, 39 percent said there was a low possibility of cheating 
within their respective organizations.  In contrast, nearly 43 percent reported high 
likelihoods of cheating.  Similar to the measurement for role conflict, a polarization of  
responses existed among those indicating high job stress.  Only 18 percent of moderate 
job stress respondents reported medium levels of cheating. 
Based upon principal-agent theory, one would reasonably expect that as levels of 
stress increases, the likelihood of cheating would also increase.  While a plurality of 
responses of high stress respondents (43 percent) reported higher levels of cheating, the 
relatively close percentage of high stress respondents for high and low  
levels of cheating appears to be inconsistent with what should be expected under the 
 
theory.  
In conclusion, the results of the analysis show remarkably similar results in the 
distribution of responses for the scales measuring role conflict and job stress for those at  
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Table 7.7. Effect of job stress on possibility of cheating- All states 
             
                                                                                       Job Stress 
     Possibility of Cheating       Low                Medium                High                 Total 
             
 
Low 51 52.6% 121 40.7% 52 39.1% 224 42.5% 
Medium 18 18.6% 77 25.9% 24 18.0% 119 22.6% 
High 28 28.9% 99 33.3% 57 42.9% 184 34.9% 
Total 97 100% 297 100% 133 100% 527 100% 
             
 
χ2 = 9.907 p = .042 
tau b = .02 
 
the higher level of both scales.  The polarized responses in the distribution are surprising 
in that one would reasonably expect like-minded individuals in the independent variable 
categories to feel similarly about the substantive issue of cheating.  The  next section 
conducts a similar analysis, only this time the definitional construct of cheating is 
changed to focus on respondents’ awareness of others cheating. 
 
Dependent Variable #2: Awareness of Others Cheating 
  
 For the purposes of this dissertation, cheating has been defined in two ways.  This 
section focuses on the issue of cheating by looking at how survey respondents perceive 
others within their organizations in terms of cheating.  This shift in perspective for the 
dependent variable of cheating provides a second way in which the issue of cheating can 
be observed.  The question used to measure this aspect of cheating (Question 15 in the 
survey) was specific in that it asked respondents if they were aware of others who took 
actions to inflate their performance levels.  While the overall plurality of responses (48 
percent) from all survey participants indicated they either strongly disagreed or disagreed 
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that they were aware of others cheating, 35 percent either strongly agreed or agreed with 
the question. 
 Bivariate analysis was used to determine if any of the seven previously identified 
independent variables were related to this second variable for cheating.  In this analysis, 
the variables for role conflict and job satisfaction were found to be associated with the 
“others” cheating variable.  These findings are presented in Table 7.3. 
 
Role Conflict and Awareness of Others Cheating 
 Role conflict resurfaces as a statistically significant variable for this second 
cheating variable as it did for the first definitional variable.  As mentioned earlier, the 
variable for role conflict emerged from three questions in the survey (see Table 7.3) 
pertaining to aspects of conflicting situations experienced by survey respondents.  It is 
important to note once again that the plurality of responses (nearly 50 percent) reported 
low levels of others cheating.  However, over one-third of respondents suggested they 
either strongly agreed or agreed that they were aware of others engaging in activities to 
inflate individual performance.  Table 7.8 presents these results. 
 
Table 7.8.   Effect of role conflict on awareness of others cheating- All states 
             
 
                                                                                   Role Conflict 
          Others Cheating              Low                 Medium              High                 Total 
             
 
Low 44 33.1% 135 52.1% 95 58.3% 274 49.4% 
Medium 29 21.8% 34 13.1% 27 16.6% 90 16.2% 
High 60 45.1% 90 34.7% 41 25.2% 191 34.4% 
Total 133 100% 259 100% 163 100% 555 100% 
             
 
χ2 = 22.758 p = .000 
tau b = .000 
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   The data suggest that when role conflict is low, there are indications of slightly 
higher reports of respondent awareness of others cheating.  However, those responding to 
medium levels of role conflict generally indicated low awareness of others cheating.  Of 
those reporting high levels of role conflict, 58 percent say they either strongly disagree or 
disagree with the notion that they are aware of others cheating.  Conversely, only 25 
percent of high role conflict respondents said they either strongly agreed or agreed with 
the assertion that they were aware of others inflating performance in their organizations. 
Unlike the findings for role conflict and the possibility of cheating variable 
already discussed, the data show an enhanced differentiation between high role conflict 
respondents and their respective views on cheating.  In the first cheating variable, for 
instance, the difference in opinion was split almost evenly between the respondents.  For 
this particular variable, a majority of high role conflict respondents indicate they do not 
think others in their organization engage in artificially inflating performance levels. 
   Even more surprising is the distribution of responses for those reporting low 
levels of role conflict.  For this definitional construct of cheating, low role conflict 
respondents were more likely to report that they are aware of others who cheat in 
comparison to the possibility of cheating definition used previously.  These findings are 
intriguing in that there is an indication of real differences in opinion on the issue of 
cheating depending on the way it is constructed.   
These findings are inconsistent with the underlying hypothesis suggesting that 
higher role conflict would result in increased reporting of others.  Instead, it appears that 
the majority of high role conflict respondents do not think their colleagues engage in 
inflating performance, while low role conflict respondents tend to think that they do. 




Job Satisfaction and Awareness of Others Cheating 
 The variable for job satisfaction was found to be statistically significant in relation  
to the respondents awareness of others cheating.  Table 7.9 presents the survey questions 
used to construct the job satisfaction scale. For those reporting low levels of job 
satisfaction, the majority of responses indicate they are not aware of others cheating.  A 
similar conclusion is arrived at for those indicating medium levels of job satisfaction.  
However, for those indicating high levels of job satisfaction, the responses are extremely 
mixed.   Table 7.10 demonstrates the results of the analysis. 
 Interestingly, over half (56 percent) of respondents who reported low job 
satisfaction indicated that they were not aware of others cheating in their organizations.  
This finding is somewhat inconsistent with what was expected under the guise of 
principal agency theory.  However, nearly a third (31 percent) of low job satisfaction 
respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that cheating occurred.  A similar 
distribution of responses occurred for those reporting moderate levels of job satisfaction.  
While this findings may not be consistent with the theory, the responses for suspicion of 
others cheating is representative of the overall results from the survey regarding cheating 
in general.  With that said, the real surprise in the data came from those reporting high 
levels of job satisfaction, which was over half of all the respondents for the survey.  For  
 
Table 7.9. Survey questions pertaining to job satisfaction scale  
             
39. All in all, I am satisfied with my job. 
40.  In general, I like working for this agency. 
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Table 7.10.  Effect of job satisfaction on awareness of others cheating- All states 
             
 
                                                                                   Job Satisfaction 
          Others Cheating               Low                Medium              High                 Total 
             
Low 51 56.0% 69 58.5% 170 43.5% 290 48.3% 
Medium 12 13.2% 22 18.6% 64 16.4% 98 16.3% 
High 28 30.8% 27 22.9% 157 40.2% 212 35.3% 
Total 91 100% 118 100% 391 100% 600 100% 
             
 
χ2 = 14.760 p = .005 
tau b = .001 
 
those high job satisfaction respondents, the data demonstrated a dramatic division 
concerning the issue of cheating. 
Forty-four percent of high job satisfaction respondents either strongly disagreed 
or disagreed with the assertion that others cheated.  On the other hand, 40 percent 
reported others were artificially inflating their performance levels.  Once again, the data  
suggest findings of a split nature regarding how high job satisfaction respondents view 
the substantive issue of cheating.  Analysis of other variables from the survey did not 
result in a reason to explain the divergent results for high job satisfaction respondents.
 The overwhelming majority of survey respondents suggested that cheating, 
regardless of how it was defined, did not occur within their organizations.  Yet , the data 
demonstrated some very interesting dichotomies in terms of respondents views on role 
conflict, job stress, and job satisfaction in comparison with their opinions on cheating.   
While the data do not appear to provide any specific insights into why these discrepancies 
existed, the mere fact they emerged provides fodder for further discussion of how these 
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variables interrelate with cheating. The following chapter, which is a companion piece to 
the discussion that has taken place here, explores whether the trends identified in this 




















PART TWO: INFLUENCING VARIABLES ON CHEATING— 
 
ANALYSIS OF STATE LEVEL RESPONDENTS 
 
 
This chapter extends the analysis begun in Chapter 7.  While the previous chapter 
examined the aggregate data from all survey respondents, this section focuses on the 
state-level responses from the four state level child support agencies that participated in 
this study.  In terms of organization for this chapter, each state program is presented 
separately.   The expectations of the analysis suggested differences would emerge on 
issues of cheating between the four state programs based upon the level each state earned 
in incentive dollars.  This expectation did not prove to hold true as Tables 8.1 and 8.2 
depict.  These tables portray a scenario where different independent variables were  
 
Table 8.1- Summary table of significant variables for the possibility of cheating 
             
 
           Independent Variables              State A     State B     State C    State D    All States 
             
Role Ambiguity      
Role Conflict   X  X 
Job Satisfaction X     
Supervision   X   
Job Stress     X 
Strategizing  X    
Knowledge of Performance 
Appraisal      
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Table 8.2.   Summary table of significant variables for awareness of others cheating 
             
 
           Independent Variables              State A    State B     State C     State D    All States 
             
Role Ambiguity    X  
Role Conflict   X  X 
Job Satisfaction  X X  X 
Supervision      
Job Stress      
Strategizing      
Knowledge of Performance 
Appraisal    X  
             
 
 
statistically significant in different states depending upon the way in which cheating was 
operationalized.  The discussion of the findings for each state follows. 
 
Findings for Cheating- State A 
 State A was identified as a “high incentive” state (see Chapter 4 for a detailed 
explanation of how the participating states’ incentive status was determined).  While  
State A represented earning high incentives, the participation rate for the survey was the 
lowest among all the participating states.  Because of the low number of participants, the 
chi-square analysis used to determine the significance of the independent variables upon 
cheating should be met with some degree of caution.  While any conclusions based upon 
the data for State A are questionable, the analysis provided some insight into how job 
satisfaction and strategizing were associated with the respondent’s perspective of the 
possibility of cheating within their organizations.  (None of the variables for the analysis 
of others cheating was found to be statistically significant for State A).   
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State A- Job Satisfaction and Possibility of Cheating 
 The analysis of the responses for State A (shown in Table 8.3) suggested that job 
satisfaction was statistically significant when compared against the scale measuring the 
possibility of cheating within State A’s child support program.  The tau-b measure of 
.546 suggested a moderately strong relationship between the two variables, although 
these findings need to be tempered because of the small number of participants.   
Because of the small number of participants, the findings here were only 
applicable in discussing the unique case of State A, and should not be applied to the other 
state programs.  Most of the respondents from State A had a high rate of job satisfaction 
(nearly 62 percent) and almost 81 percent of respondents reported either high or medium 
levels of job satisfaction.  In terms of deciding whether cheating was possible, the 
findings suggested the plurality of all respondents (42 percent) reported low levels of 
cheating.     
Among high job satisfaction respondents, however, the results were slightly 
different in that half reported medium levels of cheating.  When adding in the low 
respondents, 81 percent of high job satisfaction respondents reported medium to low  
 
Table 8.3. Effect of job satisfaction on possibility of cheating- State A 
             
 
                                                                               Job Satisfaction 
 Possibility of Cheating      Low               Medium                    High                    Total 
             
Low      4   80.0%         2    40.0%         5     31.3%       11   42.3% 
Medium      0     0.0%         0      0.0%         8     50.0%         8   30.8% 
High      1   20.0%         3    60.0%         3     18.8%         7   26.9% 
Total      5   100%         5    100%       16     100%       26   100% 
             
χ2 = 9.666 p = .046 
tau b = .546 




levels of cheating.  This finding suggests that increased job satisfaction responses among 
 
State A employees resulted in medium to low levels of reporting on the possibility of 
 
cheating.  These findings are not out of line with what would reasonably be expected 
under the guise of the theory being tested here. 
State A was the only one to report any statistically significant findings for the 
variable of job satisfaction when cheating was defined as “possibility of cheating” [Of 
note, however, is that job satisfaction was found to be significant for two states when 
cheating was defined as “others cheating.”  These findings are presented later in this 
chapter].  Strategizing was also found to be significant when cheating was constructed as 
being possible in the agency.  These findings are presented in the next section. 
 
State A- Strategizing and Possibility of Cheating 
 
  Strategizing among employees and organizations was one of the variables of 
utmost interest in terms of the variables hypothesized to have a link with cheating.  The 
idea was that the more employees engaged in strategy-making initiatives to improve 
performance, the likelihood of cheating would subsequently increase.  In addition, 
another hypothesis in this study suggested that high incentive states, such as State A, 
would report higher levels of strategizing than lower performing states.  After analyzing 
the data, it appears that with the sole exception of State A, none of the other participating 
states showed any links with strategizing and reported incidents of cheating, regardless of 
how cheating was defined.   
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 The tabular analysis (depicted in Table 8.4) for strategizing and cheating 
demonstrated that the majority of respondents from State A reported medium levels of 
strategizing within their child support program.  Over half of the respondents (52 percent)  
indicated medium levels of cheating.  Another 44 percent reported high levels of 
strategizing.  These findings suggest the overwhelming number of respondents from State 
A self-reported medium to high levels of strategizing to improve performance.  This 
finding is consistent with the underlying hypothesis that strategizing would be greater 
among higher performing states, like State A. 
In terms of cheating, however, the findings indicated that medium and high 
strategizing respondents tended to report medium to low levels of cheating (when 
cheating was defined as the possibility of cheating).  While that trend is consistent, there 
is an interesting finding in the data suggesting polarized responses in regard to cheating, 
particularly among those in the medium strategizing response set.  While 50 percent of 
respondents reported low levels of cheating, nearly 42 percent indicated a high likelihood 
of the possibility of cheating.  In contrast, bifurcated results did not appear among the 
high strategizing response set, with the overwhelming majority of responses suggesting  
 
Table 8.4- Effect of strategizing and possibility of cheating- State A 
             
                                                                              Strategizing 
Possibility of Cheating        Low                  Medium                 High                     Total 
             
Low       0    0.0%         6    50.0%          3    30.0%        9    39.1% 
Medium       0    0.0%         1      8.3%          6    60.0%        7    30.4% 
High       1   100%         5    41.7%          1    10.0%        7    30.4% 
Total       1   100%       12   100%         10   100%       23    100% 
             
χ2 = 9.529 p = .049 
tau b = .508 
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lower levels of cheating. 
In conclusion, the findings from the State A dataset need to be tempered because 
of the small number of responses to the survey.  While the number of respondents was 
low, the results found that two variables (job satisfaction and strategizing) were 
statistically significant depending upon the way cheating was characterized.  The findings 
regarding job satisfaction indicated that most were satisfied with their jobs, but suggested 
moderate levels of the possibility of cheating.  In terms of strategizing, respondents from 
State A also reported medium to high levels of strategizing to improve performance.  
When compared against the variable for the possibility of cheating, the findings 
suggested low to moderate levels of cheating being reported.   
While these findings are unique to State A, they do provide some insight into a 
high performing child support agency.  While the small number of respondents casts a 
shadow over the ability to apply these findings to other states, the findings support some 
of the tenants of principal-agent theory. 
 
Findings for Cheating—State B 
 
 The number of responses for States B, C, and D, were large enough that the 
response rate was not a concern as it was for State A.  In the case of State B, a medium-
high level incentive state, only one variable (job satisfaction) was statistically significant 
when compared against the awareness of others cheating dependent variable.  The chi-
square value for job satisfaction and awareness of others cheating was .040 with a tau-b 
significance value of .016, suggesting a relatively weak relationship between the 
variables.  The tabular results for this relationship are shown in Table 8.5.  
 




Table 8.5- Effect of job satisfaction and awareness of others cheating- State B 
             
                                                                              Strategizing 
Possibility of Cheating        Low                 Medium                  High                     Total 
             
Low      8   66.7%       10    90.9%        21    42.9%      39    54.2% 
Medium      0    0.0%         0      0.0%          5    10.2%        5      6.9% 
High      4   33.3%         1      9.1%        23    46.9%     28     38.9% 
Total     12   100%       11    100%        49   100%       72    100% 
             
χ2 = 10.015 p = .04 
tau b = .016 
 
 
State B-- Awareness of Others Cheating and Job Satisfaction 
 
 The majority of respondents from State B indicated high levels of job satisfaction.  
Sixty-eight percent of respondents reported high job satisfaction levels in response to the 
questions in the survey.  In terms of reporting being aware of others cheating, the 
majority of respondents (54 percent) supported the notion that there was a low likelihood 
of others cheating.  However, nearly 39 percent suggested high levels of others cheating 
in their organization.  Only 7 percent reported medium levels of cheating.  
  Low and medium job satisfaction respondents reported low levels of others 
cheating.  However, when the results from the high job satisfaction respondents were 
examined, another divided result set emerged (see Table 8.5).  The plurality of responses 
(47 percent) from the high job satisfaction category reported high levels of awareness of 
others cheating.  Conversely, 43 percent reported low levels of cheating.  Only 10 percent 
indicated moderate levels of cheating in the same category.  Once again, the reasons for 
these widely different results are not immediately clear.  The underlying hypothesis of 
this study suggesting that a state’s incentive level being a good predictor of cheating did 
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not hold true, and now the data present divergent results from high job satisfaction 
workers within the same state regarding cheating. 
While the reasons behind these differing perspectives on cheating remain unclear, 
the fact remains that there is a wide split between workers on this substantive issue.  This 
represents a noteworthy pattern in the response set that seems to reappear throughout the 
results from other state workers participating in this study.  While the reason for this 
divergent results set is unclear, its existence seems to be of some importance. 
 It is also important to recognize the relevance the variable for job satisfaction 
presents for this study.  Job satisfaction emerged as a statistically significant variable in 
two of the states (States B and C) and was an important factor in the overall analysis of 
all of the respondents discussed in Chapter 7.  As reported previously, the overwhelming 
number of staff from all states reported high levels of job satisfaction, regardless of the 
state in which they worked.  State B respondents were no different in this regard.  
However, the distinct split in responses from high job satisfaction respondents regarding 
their views on others cheating remains an intriguing mystery that is unfortunately not 
resolved here. 
 
Findings for State C 
 The analysis for State C respondents was striking given the similarities in data 
patterns in comparison to some of the findings previously presented.  State C exemplified 
a medium-low incentive state among the state programs participating in this study.  Of 
more interest, however, was the consistency in responses, particularly with the variable 
for role conflict that was found regardless of the way cheating was defined.  Role conflict 
was a statistically significant variable for both definitional constructs for cheating.  This 
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section focuses on the results first for the dependent variable regarding the possibility of 
cheating and is followed by a discussion focusing on the awareness of others cheating 
variable. 
 
State C—Role Conflict and the Possibility of Cheating 
 
 Respondents from State C exhibited moderate to high levels of role conflict.  The 
plurality of respondents, 48 percent, identified themselves as experiencing moderate 
levels of role conflict.  In addition, nearly one-third (32 percent) of State C respondents 
suggested they experienced high levels of role conflict.  Only 20 percent said they 
experienced low levels of role conflict.   These findings indicated that the majority of 
survey respondents from State C either reported moderate or high levels of role conflict 
while accomplishing their daily duties. 
Keeping those findings in mind, the majority of respondents reported a low 
likelihood of others cheating.  Nearly 44 percent of State C workers reported low levels 
concerning the possibility of cheating within their organizations in contrast to 34 percent 
who suggested high levels of cheating.  Only 23 percent suggested moderate levels of 
cheating.  These findings are presented in Table 8.6. 
Of particular interest was the response rate concerning cheating for those who 
self-reported moderate levels of role conflict.  The distribution of responses was nearly 
equal across all three levels of cheating.  This contrasts dramatically with low role 
conflict respondents who overwhelming reported lower levels of cheating while higher 
role conflict participants were split between low levels of cheating (44 percent), and 
higher cheating levels (42 percent). 
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Table 8.6.  Effect of role conflict on possibility of cheating- State C 
             
                                                                                   Role Conflict 
  Possibility of Cheating             Low               Medium                   High                  Total 
             
Low 38 66.7% 44 33.1% 39 44.3% 121 43.5% 
Medium 7 12.3% 45 33.8% 12 13.6% 64 23.0% 
High 12 21.1% 44 33.1% 37 42.0% 93 33.5% 
Total 57 100% 133 100% 88 100% 278 100% 
             
χ2 = 27.94 p = .000 
tau b = .017 
 
 These findings are intriguing given there appears to be a significant difference in 
opinion in the way respondents viewed the possibility of cheating in comparison to the 
degree of conflict they felt in doing their jobs.  Those who self-reported low levels of 
conflict also tended to report lower scores regarding the possibility of cheating.  As role 
conflict increased, these views shifted dramatically.  While the reasons explaining these 
differences in the distributional responses were not readily apparent, the findings 
suggested for State C respondents that role conflict issues had an impact on the way they 
viewed the possibility of cheating within their organizations.  Interestingly, the variable 
for role conflict was also found to be statistically significant for State C respondents 
when cheating was defined in terms of being aware of others cheating.  These data are 
presented later in this chapter. 
 
State C—Supervision and the Possibility of Cheating 
 
 The variable for supervision has been, at least theoretically, an important one for 
this study, particularly in light of the importance the concept poses for principal-agent 
theory.  It is reasonable to expect, given the constructs of principal-agent theory, that 
more intense levels of supervision result in lower levels of cheating.  The data gathered 
    
 
100
for State C respondents appeared to support this theoretical construct.  State C 
respondents who self-reported lower levels of supervision reported significantly higher 
rates of cheating than those who reported higher levels of supervision. 
 Most of the respondents from State C reported moderate to high levels of 
supervision.  Nearly 47 percent of respondents reported moderate supervision levels, 
while 40 percent reported high supervision and monitoring of behavior.  Only 13 percent 
of responses indicated experience with low levels of supervision.  These findings suggest 
moderate to high levels of supervision as being the norm within State C’s child support 
program.  These findings are presented in Table 8.7. 
 As mentioned previously, the data suggested significant differences in the way 
State C respondents perceived issues of supervision and how it interacted with their 
views of cheating within their organizations.  Table 8.7 portrays those reporting low 
levels of supervision also reported high levels of cheating.  Fifty-three percent of low 
supervision respondents indicated high levels of cheating.  Conversely, 32 percent  
of low supervision respondents reported low levels of cheating.  When examining the 
medium and high supervision respondents, significant differences in opinion regarding 
 
Table 8.7.  Effect of supervision on possibility of cheating- State C 
             
                                                                                            Supervision 
Possibility of Cheating               Low                  Medium                   High                   Total 
             
Low 12 31.6% 62 45.6% 53 45.3% 127 43.6% 
Medium 6 15.8% 23 16.9% 34 29.1% 63 21.6% 
High 20 52.6% 51 37.5% 30 25.6% 101 34.7% 
Total 38 100% 136 100% 117 100% 291 100% 
             
χ2 = 13.033 p = .011 
tau b = .031 
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cheating began to emerge.  For example, 46 percent of medium supervision respondents 
reported low levels of cheating, while 38 percent indicated high levels of cheating.  High 
supervision respondents overwhelmingly reported low levels of cheating.  Nearly 46 
percent reported low levels of cheating, while 26 percent reported high levels of cheating 
among high supervision respondents. 
In sum, the findings regarding the relationship between supervision and the 
possibility of cheating appears to be of some significance.  This finding is important in 
that for State C respondents, the theoretical expectation that more supervision resulted in 
fewer reports of cheating seemed to hold true in the majority of cases.  Similarly, role 
conflict also emerged as a statistically significant variable for State C respondents when 
cheating was defined as being possible within the IV-D agency.  Low role conflict 
respondents reported lower levels of cheating in comparison to their medium and high 
role conflict colleagues.  Of particular note was the way in which high role conflict 
respondents were split in their responses regarding the possibility of cheating.  While the 
data do not provide an explanation for this phenomenon, the variable for role conflict 
emerged as one of significance across the states participating in this study.  The following 
pages provide some additional detail regarding the way in which the relationship between 
role conflict and being aware of others cheating emerges for State C respondents. 
 
State C—Role Conflict and the Awareness of Others Cheating 
 
 The scale for role conflict was statistically significant when compared against the 
construct measuring the respondent’s awareness of others cheating.  The chi-square value 
for this relationship was 20.284, which is significant at the .001 level.  However the tau-b 
measure (.000) suggests an extremely weak relationship between the variables.  The role 
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conflict construct was interesting because it emerged as one of significance for State C 
respondents using both constructs for cheating.  Table 8.8 presents the bivariate table for 
the relationship between these two variables. 
As discussed in the previous section, the majority of State C respondents reported 
medium to high levels of role conflict.  The data suggested that low role conflict 
respondents were likely to report high levels of others cheating (45 percent).  Of more 
interest, however, was the response among medium and high role conflict respondents.  
Sixty percent of medium role conflict participants and 67 percent of high role conflict 
respondents reported low levels of others cheating. 
 These findings were particularly interesting when compared to the same analysis 
for role conflict using the first definition of cheating.  In the first analysis, medium and 
high role conflict respondents were much more likely to report high levels of the 
possibility of cheating than they were for actually being aware of others cheating.  This 
finding is intriguing given it demonstrates the differences that develops depending on the 
way cheating is defined.   
It is also important to recognize how this finding aligns with the theoretical  
 
Table 8.8.  Effect of role conflict on awareness of others cheating- State C 
             
                                                                                 Role Conflict 
Awareness of Cheating         Low                 Medium                  High                 Total 
             
Low 19 32.8% 80 59.7% 51 67.1% 150 56.0%
Medium 13 22.4% 14 10.4% 12 15.8% 39 14.6%
High 26 44.8% 40 29.9% 13 17.1% 79 29.5%
Total 58 100% 134 100% 76 100% 268 100% 
             
χ2 = 20.284 p = .000 
tau b = .000 
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expectations one expects when looking at cheating through the lens of principal-agent 
theory.  The theory suggests that as role conflict is minimized, agents will have a better 
understanding of their role and will be more likely to accomplish the tasks given by the 
principal.  In this case, that assertion does not appear to be the case.  Instead, State C 
respondents reported relatively high levels of role conflict.  Given the theoretical 
underpinnings described previously, it would be reasonable to expect higher levels of 
cheating.  This expectation simply does not hold true for reports for the variable for 
awareness of others cheating among State C respondents. 
While the variable for role conflict was statistically significant for both dependent 
variables for cheating, the data suggest divergent results.  This finding is noteworthy 
primarily for the realization that much of this analysis is highly dependent upon the way 
in which cheating is defined.  The results clearly demonstrated very different outcomes 
that were dependent upon the way cheating was actually constructed. 
 
State C- Job Satisfaction and Awareness of Others Cheating 
 The variable for job satisfaction was also found to be statistically significant 
(p<.05) when compared against the others cheating variable for State C.  The tau-b 
measure of .003 suggests a weak relationship between the two variables.  Table 8.9 
presents these findings in tabular form.  As the table suggests, the vast majority of 
respondents from State C reported high levels of job satisfaction.  Nearly 57 percent of  
respondents reported job satisfaction at high levels.  In contrast, only 18 percent indicated 
low job satisfaction rates. 
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Table 8.9.  Effect of job satisfaction on awareness of others cheating- State C 
             
                                                                                 Job Satisfaction 
Awareness of Cheating         Low                 Medium                  High                 Total 
             
Low 33 63.5% 45 66.2% 49 30.8% 127 45.5%
Medium 7 13.5% 10 14.7% 84 52.8% 101 36.2%
High 12 23.1% 13 19.1% 26 16.4% 51 18.3%
Total 52 100% 68 100% 159 100% 279 100% 
             
χ2 = 9.825 p = .043 
tau b = .003 
 
Concerning cheating, the plurality of the total responses indicated low levels of 
others cheating (46 percent).  Of particular interest was the response from low and 
medium job satisfaction respondents on cheating.  Sixty-four percent of low job 
satisfaction respondents reported low levels of cheating.  Similarly, 66 percent of those 
demonstrating moderate job satisfaction rates also reported low levels of cheating.   
The majority of high job satisfaction respondents, however, tended to report moderate 
levels of cheating (53 percent) with another 31 percent indicating low levels of cheating. 
 Job satisfaction was one of those variables that did not fit easily into the 
theoretical construct of principal-agent theory.  The hypothetical expectation was that as 
job satisfaction levels decreased, reports of cheating would increase.  This particular 
conclusion was not supported by the data.  In fact, the opposite seemed to hold true for 
low and medium level job satisfaction respondents.  Curiously, another unexpected 
change among those reporting high levels of job satisfaction came to life from the 
analysis.  Again, it seemed somewhat logical to expect that people experiencing high 
levels of job satisfaction would report lower levels of cheating.  While this expectation 
held true to some degree, the fact that a majority of high job satisfaction respondents 
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reported moderate cheating levels is surprising given the theoretical expectations 
previously discussed.    
 In conclusion, the analysis of responses from State C child support workers 
demonstrated a number of statistically significant variables regarding cheating.  Of more 
importance, however, was the finding that the significance of these variables was highly 
dependent upon the way in which the variable for cheating was constructed.  This finding 
seems somewhat germane, but is important nonetheless.  These conclusions emphasize 
the idea that the way variables are constructed has a distinct bearing on the way 
respondents answer questions.  For this study, the variable for cheating, was defined in 
two different ways and the level of significance of the independent variables appeared to 
be highly dependent upon the manner in which cheating was constructed in the survey 
instrument. 
 
Findings for State D 
 
 State D represented the lowest of incentive states among those participating in this 
study.  While its incentive status was low, the response rate to the survey was relatively 
high in comparison to the other states.  The analysis of the data suggests that none of the 
independent variables was statistically significant for State D respondents when using the 
“possibility of cheating” dependent variable.  However, when the analysis focused on the 
“awareness of others” cheating variable, two variables emerged as significant: role 
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State D—Role Ambiguity and Awareness of Others Cheating 
 
 The respondents from State D reported high levels of role ambiguity, suggesting 
that for many workers their job duties are unclear.  Nearly 78 percent of respondents from 
State D reported high levels of role ambiguity.  This particular finding is consistent with 
principal-agent theory on the basis that State D is a low incentive (and thus low 
performing) state.  Given the theoretical construct this study is operating under, the 
finding that role ambiguity is an issue among workers in this environment was not 
particularly surprising. 
The analysis also found that State D respondents who identified low levels of role 
ambiguity, also reported high levels of cheating.  Table 8.10 presents these findings in 
more detail.  Forty-six percent of those reporting low levels of role ambiguity reported 
high levels of others cheating, while 36 percent reported low levels of cheating.  Different 
results emerged for those reporting moderate and high levels of role ambiguity.  For those 
reporting medium levels of role ambiguity, 41 percent indicated moderate levels of 
cheating, and another 32 percent indicated low levels of cheating.  This pattern changes, 
once again, when the high role ambiguity respondent’s answers were analyzed.   
  
Table 8.10.  Effect of role ambiguity on awareness of others cheating- State D 
             
                                                                                 Role Ambiguity 
Awareness of Cheating         Low                 Medium                  High                 Total 
             
Low 4 36.4% 11 32.4% 63 40.1% 78 38.6% 
Medium 2 18.2% 14 41.2% 27 17.2% 43 21.3% 
High 5 45.5% 9 26.5% 67 42.7% 81 40.1% 
Total 
1
1 100% 34 100% 157 100% 
20
2 100% 
             
χ2 = 9.968 p = .041 
tau b = .776 




Among this category, the plurality (43 percent) reported high levels of cheating, while an 
almost equal proportion (40 percent) indicated low levels of cheating.   
The relationship for role ambiguity in comparison to the awareness of others 
cheating variable was not consistent across the categories of the independent variable 
(role ambiguity).  The analysis demonstrates differences in opinion on cheating 
depending upon the category of role ambiguity the respondent fell in.  While it is 
notinconsistent to expect higher reports of cheating among low role ambiguity 
respondents, the fact that the data demonstrate more moderate to low levels of cheating 
for medium role ambiguity respondents was not expected. 
Even more surprising, however, was the bifurcated result found among high role 
ambiguity respondents from State D.  The hypothetical expectations really did not 
explain why the respondents were split nearly equally on the issue of cheating.  Why is it 
that nearly the same proportion of high role ambiguity respondents viewed cheating from 
almost polar opposite perspectives?  While this analysis really does not answer the 
question, the fact that these polarized responses to many of the variables seems to 
indicate other variables are having some influence on these decisions. 
 
State D—Knowledge of Performance Appraisal and  
Awareness of Others Cheating 
 
 Given that State D was considered a low incentive state in this study, it was not 
surprising to find that only 18 percent of respondents reported a high level of 
understanding how their performance appraisal system works within their organization.  
Conversely, 29 percent reported low levels of understanding and 54 percent indicated 
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medium levels of understanding.  The data suggested low to moderate levels of 
knowledge regarding how employee performance was rated.  
 Another noteworthy finding was that the scale measuring knowledge of the 
performance appraisal system was found to be statistically significant (chi-square 9.622, 
p<.05).  The relationship between knowledge of performance appraisal and others 
cheating was relatively strong (tau-b = .845).  State D was the only participating state 
where this particular variable appeared to be of some importance. With that said, the 
pattern within the data (as shown in Table 8.11) indicated more polarized results 
regarding cheating, depending upon the category of the independent variable (knowledge 
of performance appraisal). 
Among low knowledge respondents, the plurality of responses indicated low 
levels of others cheating (45 percent).  Conversely, 40 percent of low knowledge 
respondents indicated high levels of cheating with only 15 percent falling somewhere in 
between.  Regarding more moderate knowledge respondents, the data suggested a 
relatively equal distribution in the responses with a high of 39 percent reporting high 
levels of cheating, as opposed to 33 percent who reported low levels (27 percent  
 
Table 8.11.  Effect of knowledge of performance appraisal on awareness of others 
cheating—State D 
             
                                                             Knowledge of Performance Appraisal 
Awareness of Cheating         Low                 Medium                  High                 Total 
             
Low 24 45.3% 33 33.3% 18 54.5% 75 40.5%
Medium 8 15.1% 27 27.3% 2 6.1% 37 20.0%
High 21 39.6% 39 39.4% 13 39.4% 73 39.5%
Total 53 100% 99 100% 33 100% 185 100% 
             
χ2 = 9.622 p = .047 
tau b = .845 
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indicated medium levels of cheating).   
Again, of most interest were those reporting high knowledge of how the 
performance appraisal system works.  Once again, the data demonstrated somewhat 
polarized responses for cheating in this category of respondents.  For high knowledge 
workers in State D, the majority of responses (55 percent) fell within the low cheating 
area.  This particular finding meant that the majority of employees who self-reported high 
levels of understanding of how their performance was measured did not feel others  
artificially inflated performance in their organizations.  Interestingly, 39 percent of these 
same respondents felt otherwise, indicating high awareness levels of others cheating.  
Very few (6 percent) fell somewhere between the two extreme views. 
 Respondents identifying high levels of understanding of the performance rating 
system were important in that, hypothetically speaking, it was reasonable to expect to 
find higher levels of cheating being reported from this group.  The basis for this line of 
thinking was that those who really understood how performance was measured might be 
more likely to know of methods that could be used to increase performance.  The findings 
from the data suggest otherwise for State D respondents.  When the majority of high 
knowledge participants suggest low levels of cheating, the hypothetical expectation was 
turned on its proverbial ear a bit. 
 The reasons behind these findings could be numerous.  It may be that the 
performance appraisal system was created in such a way that manipulation of 
performance was not possible.  While this conclusion may be true, the finding that 39 
percent feel others are cheating makes it highly unlikely.  The reasons behind this split in 
thinking remain unclear.  However, there was a definite difference of opinion among high 
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knowledge respondents regarding the issue of others cheating.  Further research is 
warranted in order to fully understand these reasons more clearly. 
 This chapter analyzed the issue of cheating by focusing on survey results from 
each participating state’s perspective.  The findings presented here demonstrated a 
dramatically different perspective from those identified in Chapter 7, which focused on 
the responses from all of the states combined.  In order to summarize these differences, 
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 identified those variables that emerged as statistically significant at the 
individual and aggregate level for each of the two definitional categories for cheating. 
As these two tables present, there appears to be little in the way of logical patterns 
associated with which variables were significant and which ones were not at the state 
level.  One of the hypotheses this research was testing dealt specifically with expectations 
of responses in accordance to the level of incentives each state earned.  Chapter 6 
demonstrated little differences between respondents from each of the participating states 
regarding knowledge of the incentive system and cheating.   
 While these findings present some interesting conclusions, the underlying 
explanation for significance among the variables remains unknown.  Of particular interest 
was the wide-ranging views of similarly minded respondents on many of the independent 
variables concerning their views on cheating.  The findings presented here acknowledge 
wide discrepancies in the responses.  These divergent viewpoints require further 
examination and research in order to gain an improved understanding of why these 
responses were so varied in nature.   
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In terms of advancing this study, the findings presented in Chapters 7 and 8 are 
used to construct the basis of a regression model that will seek to further clarify the role 












FEELING PRESSURE TO CHEAT: A PREDICTIVE MODEL 
 
 The previous chapters examined how child support workers viewed the issue of 
cheating in terms of whether: 1) it was possible to cheat on performance levels, and 2) if 
others within their organizations engaged in efforts to inflate individual performance.  
These two aspects of “cheating” attempted to get at the issue of cheating, without directly 
implicating survey respondents regarding the potentially controversial subject matter. 
 The most direct question related to cheating asked respondents if they had felt any 
pressure from someone in their organization to manipulate their caseload within the past 
year.  [This was the most pointed question in the survey pertaining to the issue of 
cheating.]  This construct for cheating acted as the dependent variable for the analysis 
conducted in this chapter.  In order to build a predictive, multivariate model to describe 
whether respondents answered “Yes” to this question, binary logistic regression was used 
to explore this aspect of cheating further.  The findings from Chapters 7 and 8 serve as 
the foundation for deciding which variables to include in the development of this 
multivariate regression model. 
 
Dependent Variable: Pressure to Cheat 
 
 The dependent variable used in this model is the response results from the 
question asking if participants felt pressure to cheat.  A minority of respondents (a little 
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more than 11 percent) indicated they had felt pressure to cheat within a year prior to 
completing the survey.  This particular finding is consistent with what has been reported 
in previous chapters that cheating (at least as construed in the survey) was relatively low 
within the four child support programs studied here. 
 In order to construct the model, the dependent variable was recoded as a dummy 
variable with “Yes” responses coded as a “1” and all other responses a “0”.  Using binary 
logistic regression, the affirmative responses to the questions were the ones of particular 
interest (because they indicated the respondent has felt pressure to cheat) and coding the 
cheating variable in this way allowed the regression method to be more easily used and 




 A number of independent variables were used to construct the multivariate model.   
First, the scaled responses measuring job satisfaction and role conflict were included in 
the model because each was identified as statistically significant in the analysis 
conducted in chapters seven and eight.  Each of these two variables was constructed as 
dummy variables.  The construction of the dummy variables was done so that those 
respondents who self-identified with “high” levels on the job satisfaction and role conflict 
scales were coded with a “1” and all other scores with a “0.”  Any missing data were not 
included in the construction of the original scaled items. 
 The second substantive variable added to the model was the response to the 
question of whether organizations could receive additional funding for outstanding 
performance.  It seemed reasonable to include this variable as it provided a measure for 
the respondent’s knowledge level regarding the potential for agencies to receive funding 
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for good performance levels.  As Chapter 6 reported, a small number of respondents from 
all the states appeared to be unaware that they could earn incentive funds for high 
performance levels.  This variable was included, as it seemed reasonable to expect that 
those indicating high knowledge levels of incentive funding might demonstrate a higher 
propensity to engage in cheating activities.  This variable was coded as a dummy variable 
with a “1” for “yes” responses and a “0” for either “no” or “don’t know” responses.  
Given the theoretical underpinnings of this study, the variable could potentially have an 
impact on respondents’ notions of cheating. 
 Third, the variable measuring whether respondents felt that performance levels 
could be inflated was also added to the model.  It made sense that those who indicated it 
was possible to manipulate performance might be more likely to say that they themselves 
felt pressure to cheat.  Like the previous variables, this response set was also added as a 
dummy variable with “strongly agree” responses coded as a “1” and all other responses 
as a “0”.  This was done so that those who were the most adamant in their responses on 
this question were included in the regression model.  “Don’t know” responses were not 
included in the construct of the dummy variable. 
 A fourth variable added to the model was the issue of worker experience.  This 
variable resulted from responses to how many years respondents had worked in their 
current position.  The range of responses to this question varied from zero to thirty-five 
years.  The mean score was a little over six years, with a standard deviation of 5.677.  
Any missing responses for this question were discarded, although there were only seven 
respondents who chose not to answer this question.   
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 The experience variable was included for two reasons.  First, it seemed that job 
tenure needed to be addressed somewhere in the model.  While there was nothing 
substantive in the literature discussing the impact tenure had on cheating activities, it 
seemed that those with more experience would have a better understanding of how 
performance could potentially be manipulated.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, 
the variable was included in the analysis because it added an interval level variable to the 
regression equation.  While a variable like age might have also served this purpose, the 
variable for years of experience had a significantly higher number of responses, unlike 
the question inquiring into the respondent’s age.  The addition of the experience variable, 
in addition to the aforementioned dummy variables, resulted in a more methodologically 
robust model from which the research question regarding cheating could be pursued. 
Finally, a number of demographic variables, including the respondents’ gender, 
race, and state of residence provided baseline characteristics for the model.  Each of these 
variables was also coded as dummy variables.  For gender, male was coded as a “1” and 
female a “0”.  The respondents’ race was coded a “1” for Caucasian and a “0” for all 
other responses.  Finally, the respondents’ state was coded as a “1” for State D (the 
lowest incentive state) and all others were coded with a “0.”  This was done primarily to 
view the relationship of how being a member of a low performing state impacted the 




 Of the possible 755 cases in the dataset, 559 (74 percent) were included in the 
binary logistic regression analysis.  The model demonstrated a pseudo R square value of 
.187.  While the pseudo R square value is relatively weak, the model improved the odds 
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of successfully predicting a “Yes” response to the question of whether respondents felt 
pressure to cheat.  While the odds are relatively low for accurately predicting how a 
respondent would answer the questions the variables in the model increased those odds to 
some degree.  Table 9.1 presents the logistic regression coefficients, the Wald chi-square 
test results, and the probability values for each of the predictor variables used in the 
construction of the model. 
Analysis of the model suggested that three variables were of particular 
importance: job satisfaction, role conflict, and responses indicating it was possible to 
inflate performance.  All three variables were significant when employing a .05 criterion 
for statistical significance.  These results are consistent with the data presented in 
previous chapters of this dissertation.  The variables for gender, race, state, knowledge of 
incentives, and years of experience contributed to the overall model but were not 
statistically significant variables in the analysis. 
 
Table 9.1. Logistic regression predicting pressure to cheat from: Gender, race, state, job 
satisfaction, role conflict, possible to inflate performance, and awareness of incentives 
             
Independent Predictor Variable        B         Exponentiated B     Wald χ2      Probability 
             
Job Satisfaction -1.383 0.251 16.546 0.000 
Role Conflict 0.81 2.248 6.779 0.009 
Possible to Inflate Performance 1.074 2.926 6.012 0.014 
Knowledge of Incentives -6.21 0.537 2.009 0.156 
Gender 0.092 1.096 0.054 0.817 
Race -0.075 0.928 0.044 0.834 
State D -0.334 0.716 0.924 0.336 
Years Experience 0.006 1.006 0.047 0.828 
             
N = 559 




    
 
117
Job Satisfaction and Feeling Pressure to Cheat 
 
 The results from the binary logistic regression analysis demonstrated that job 
satisfaction was negatively associated with the variable measuring pressure to cheat.   
This substantively means that as levels of job satisfaction increase, respondents were less 
likely to report cheating (beta = -1.383) when controlling for the effects of the other 
independent variables in the model.  The chi-square test also indicates that the 
relationship between these variables was statistically significant at the .001 probability 
level.   
 This particular finding is noteworthy, because it suggests satisfaction levels that 
come from engaging in work, in this case the child support enforcement program, have a 
subsequent effect on whether one self-reported pressure to artificially inflate performance 
levels.  While the conclusion from this finding does not go so far as to suggest that 
respondents gave into the pressure, it does indicate that those feeling higher levels of job 
satisfaction were less likely to say that they felt pressure to engage in questionable 
activities. 
 Of more importance, however, was the way in which job satisfaction levels 
incorporate within the concept of principal-agent theory.  It seems logical that this 
particular finding falls in line with what would be expected under the constructs of the 
theory.  It was not particularly surprising to find that the analysis suggested knowing the 
level of job satisfaction helped in successfully predicting whether respondents reported 
their involvement with cheating-types of behaviors.  This result is consistent with a 
variety of theories, and does not exclusively reside within the tenants of principal-agent 
theory. 
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 In sum, the concept of job satisfaction was reported by others in the literature to 
be an important variable when studying cheating.  This study confirms that notion in the 
analysis of child support professionals and their experience in conducting their work.  It 
is important to recognize that this analysis only asked respondents if they felt pressure 
from someone to engage in these behaviors and not whether they actually participated in 
these types of activities.  Nonetheless, the data suggest that lower levels of job 
satisfaction result in higher probabilities of self-reporting of incidents of pressure to 
cheat. 
 
Role Conflict and Feeling Pressure to Cheat 
 
 Like job satisfaction, role conflict was another variable of importance within the 
literature related to the issue of cheating.  Given the conclusions reached in previous 
chapters of this study, it was not surprising to find that role conflict emerged as an 
important variable in the regression model developed here.  The results from the logistic 
regression analysis suggests that as respondents report increased levels of role conflict, 
they are more likely to report that have felt pressure to cheat when the effects of the 
independent variables in the model are controlled for.  The logistic regression coefficient 
for role conflict in the model was .810, which suggested it was positively associated with 
predicting “yes” responses for feeling pressure to cheat.  In addition, the chi-square value 
for role conflict was statistically significant at the .05 level. 
 This particular finding fits very nicely within the constructs of principal agency 
theory.  It was not surprising to find that those feeling higher levels of role conflict 
significantly aided the model in predicting “yes” responses to the question at hand.  The 
previous chapters in this study suggested that those expressing higher levels of role 
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conflict viewed cheating differently from those reporting lower levels of conflict.  The 
fact that this variable became significant in this analysis was not surprising given what 
was previously presented in this dissertation. 
 More importantly was that the data suggested that issues pertaining to role 
conflict are of some importance when discussing the issue of cheating.  It makes sense to 
conclude that those child support professionals who felt high levels of role conflict may 
have also felt pressure to engage in activities that could be construed as cheating.  
Responses to the questions that provide the basis for the scale construction of role 
conflict (see Appendix C) all suggest that respondents who scored high on this scale 
strongly feel conflicted as they carry out their duties.  This sense of conflict may result in 
a sense of acceptance when it comes to issues of cheating within the workplace.  This 
finding is important for administrators to not only recognize the detrimental effects 
poorly constructed job duties and roles can pose for their workers, but more importantly, 
what it means for the possibility of unethical behavior.  The findings presented here 
demonstrated that not only was role conflict an issue at the individual level, but it may 
have a systemic impact on work processes generally, and cheating in particular. 
 
Possible to Inflate Performance and Feeling Pressure to Cheat 
 
 The final statistically significant variable in the model was the respondents’ report 
of whether it was possible to inflate performance in their respective agencies.  The 
findings of the logistic regression model suggest that survey participants who reported 
that it was possible to inflate performance were more likely to report that they had felt 
pressure to cheat when the model controlled for the effects of the other independent 
variables.   
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This variable was included in the model because it made sense to try to 
incorporate the effects of respondents’ ideas of whether it was possible to cheat (or not).  
As a result, it was not a surprise to find that reporting higher levels of agreement on the 
issue of whether inflating performance was possible appeared to impact the successfully 
prediction of “yes” responses for feeling pressure to inflate performance.  It seemed 
logical that one’s knowledge, for lack of a better term, that performance could be 
manipulated was, in part, because respondents felt pressure to cheat by someone in their 
organization.  If that is the case, the next question is one of causal direction.  Does feeling 
pressure to cheat precipitate respondents’ understanding of cheating, or vice versa?  
Unfortunately, the data gathered do not answer this question, and further research is 
necessary to develop a clearer understanding of this issue. 
 The model constructed for this dissertation is only partially successful in 
predicting whether survey participants answered affirmatively regarding whether they felt 
pressure to cheat in their organizational settings.  The overall pseudo r-square value of 
.187 suggested that additional variables beyond those included in the model are necessary 
to full explain the dependent variable..  This study acknowledges this inherent weakness 
in the model.  
 With those weaknesses acknowledged, however, the findings that role conflict, 
job satisfaction, and ideas about the possibility of cheating provide additional insight into 
the nature of cheating.  These findings, for the most part, are consistent with the tenets of 
principal-agency theory previously presented in this dissertation and are important, not 
only because they support the underlying theory this study is based upon, but also 
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because they provide real evidence public administrators can use as they develop and 
enhance performance-based evaluation tools in child support agencies. 
 The findings provide additional evidence of the importance clearly defined job 
roles and functions can have on potentially reducing unethical behaviors among 
employees.  The evidence, as presented here, found a link between inadequate role 
definitions and one’s personal sentiments regarding feeling pressure to cheat.  While the 
study does not answer whether these individuals gave in to that pressure, it does suggest 
that increased clarity of job functions can result in a work environment where 
questionable activities, such as cheating, can be reduced.   
 In conclusion, these findings provide evidentiary value for child support 
administrators to improve the work environment of their staff.  This dissertation has 
reported that the overwhelming number of participants in the study reported that cheating 
was not an issue in their organizations.  However, a significant minority of respondents 
suggested these problems did exist.  Child support administrators would be wise to 
implement efforts to try to improve employee job satisfaction and reduce role conflict, 
because tangible results can emerge regarding the issue of cheating within organizations.  
Taking steps to address these issues, in addition to regular training regarding ethical 
considerations in child support agencies, could greatly enhance efforts to further reduce 
the likelihood of cheating within organizations.  Reducing the likelihood of cheating 










DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
At the onset of this study, the author acknowledged the importance the nation’s 
child support program plays in the welfare system.  The role of the child support program 
has evolved dramatically throughout the years, but the fact remains that regular, steady 
payment of child support results in consistent economic resources for families which, in 
turn, helps increase the likelihood of self-reliance and decreases the need for dependence 
upon the state for financial assistance.  Given these facts, performance of state and local 
child support programs has become of increased importance to help realize the goals of 
promoting responsibility for noncustodial parents and their children. 
Because the child support program deals primarily with collecting money, it has 
become a relatively simple task to track and monitor the performance levels of child 
support agencies within the IV-D program.  This ability to monitor performance, 
combined with the growing acknowledgement of the aforementioned positive outcomes 
for public assistance programs has resulted in a performance-driven mission for the child 
support program.  Performance-based incentives have emerged to act as an inducement 
for child support agencies to improve performance in order to receive additional funding 
for programs.  Given this reliance upon the use of performance-based incentive 
monitoring, the child support program seemed an obvious choice to study the impact of 
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cheating within organizations.  This study has resulted in some interesting and important 
insights regarding the issue of cheating.  It is important to note that the scope of this study 
focused on four child support agencies.  The methodology employed by the study 
successfully allowed for the four participating child support agencies to represent high, 
moderate, and low performing agencies providing child support services.  Each of the 
four programs was administered by the state in which they resided.  While the findings 
and conclusions presented here provide important data for child support administrators to 
consider, they should also note the limited nature of the methodology employed in this 
study.  Furthermore, additional comprehensive research surrounding the issue of cheating 
needs to be conducted among the fifty-four IV-D programs that comprise the child 
support program in the United States. 
 The four participating state programs allowed their staff to answer questions 
covering a wide range of subject matter.  Of primary interest to this study were the 
respondent’s feelings about cheating within their organization.  Cheating was constructed 
as one’s ability to artificially inflate performance.  Respondents were asked whether it 
was possible to inflate performance, if they were aware of others who actually inflated 
their performance levels, and whether they themselves felt pressure to inflate 
performance.   
In addition to these questions, respondents were asked a battery of questions 
pertaining to their work tasks, knowledge and understanding of performance-based 
incentives, supervision levels within their organizations, job satisfaction, and role conflict 
and ambiguity.  These questions were used to construct scales for each of the items and 
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bivariate and regression analysis was used to explore their impact on the issues of 
cheating. 
While the scope of this study was limited, it has produced important findings that 
warrant further consideration regarding the issue of cheating.  The following pages 
summarize the key findings of this study, along with a brief discussion each poses for the 
theoretical constructs upon which this study is based, along with the practical results 
child support professionals can draw from the conclusions of the study. 
 
Finding #1—Performance Matters for 
Child Support Professionals 
 
 The respondents from the four states participating in this study indicated strongly 
that they felt their individual performance contributed to their organization’s overall 
performance level.  This finding supports the notion that respondents identified with the 
idea that their performance mattered and that their individual efforts contributed to their 
organization’s overarching missions.  Respondents from all of the participating states 
suggested that they worked with their supervisors primarily and co-workers secondarily 
in strategizing to find ways to improve their performance.   
While respondents were prone to respond that performance matters, there was a 
general finding that this search for finding ways to improve performance was limited to 
the worker-supervisor relationship.  There was a general agreement from respondents of 
all states that their respective organizations did not contribute to a sense of developing 
strategies to improve performance.  This finding suggests some level of disconnect 
between front-line workers and their larger organizational structure. This particular 
finding is important because it exposes differences in goals and organizational purposes 
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between different levels of an organization, something that principal-agent theory does 
not account for. 
Whether the organizations studied here played a role or not in implementing 
measures to improve performance is moot for this discussion.  What is important to 
recognize is that there was a general finding from all of the participating child support 
programs that front-line workers felt their organizations did not play an active role in 
developing methods to improve performance. 
  Unfortunately, the method employed in this study cannot verify if this lack of 
organizational involvement actually exists.  However, it is important to recognize that 
most workers felt that the organizational whole was not an active participant in 
developing ways to improve performance.  If the organizational unit is as uninvolved as 
workers say, it may be a causal reason for the second significant finding of this study: 
workers were unaware of performance-based incentives for their agencies. 
 
Finding #2—Unawareness of Incentive System 
 
While the actual role of the organization remains unclear, a significant finding of 
this study was that the overwhelming majority of survey participants was not aware of a 
child support incentive system.  When specifically asked, only 20 percent of respondents 
correctly reported that their agency could receive additional funds for outstanding 
performance.  This percentage varied slightly between the states, but not by much.  More 
importantly, over half of the total respondents indicated that they were unaware if their 
agency could earn additional funding for good performance.  In a similar vein, only one-
third of respondents incorrectly reported that their organization was incapable of earning 
additional funding based on performance.   
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In sum, the overall finding regarding knowledge of incentives was very low 
among front-line child support workers.  While it appears evident that knowledge of 
incentives was low, a secondary question inquiring into the possibility of penalties for 
poor performance brought about significantly different results.  When asked about the 
consequences for poor performance, over three-fourths of all respondents indicated their 
organizations were subject to penalties for not meeting adequate performance standards.  
When analyzed at the state-level, this overall trend did not vary much from the aggregate 
totals. 
This finding poses some interesting discussion points for the issue of awareness of 
incentives.  Among those states participating in the study, workers appeared to have a 
lack of understanding of what I will call the “positive” aspects of the child support 
incentive program, but understood all too well the “negative” consequences that could 
result from poor organizational performance.  The reasons for this bifurcated 
understanding between the positive and negative components of incentives remain 
unclear, but certainly warrant further research to improve understanding of how child 
support workers differentiate between the two aspects of the incentive system.  Of 
particular importance would be to improve understanding of how organizational 
interactions with workers impact the way positive and negative inducements are 
perceived by workers. 
When the survey instrument was developed, careful attention was paid to 
developing a secondary process through which worker knowledge of the incentive system 
could be measured.  The reasoning for this was that it was possible that workers might 
not understand the overall concept of the incentive system, but might be able to readily 
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identify specific tasks used to construct the performance measures associated with the 
incentive program.  Workers were given a list of tasks, some of which included the 
components comprising the incentive measures and others that did not. 
Workers from all four state programs identified incentive and nonincentive tasks 
almost equally.  This finding supports the idea that child support workers do not 
demonstrate a high level of knowledge of the incentive program regardless of whether it 
was constructed abstractly as a concept of incentives, or whether it is broken down into 
tasks that makeup the incentive structure.  Either way, workers did not identify them as 
such. 
These findings were somewhat surprising.  Child support agencies throughout the 
country have complained vocally about the cut in funding in relation to federal matching 
dollars for incentives that resulted from passage of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005.  
The finding that workers were unaware of incentives or incentives tasks is somewhat 
inconsistent with the importance many IV-D directors have attributed to these funds.  
This study is incapable of answering the question of why these discrepancies 
exist.  However, future research would help obtain a better understanding of why these 
incentive-funding issues do not resonate with front-line workers.  The bottom line is that 
child support workers participating in this study demonstrated a poor understanding of 
the nature of incentives. 
 
Finding #3—Understanding Cheating Within  
the Child Support Context 
 
 For the purposes of this study, cheating was defined as being able to artificially 
inflate performance levels.  Because this study placed an emphasis on cheating, it was 
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important to try to find a way to conceptualize the idea of cheating in a way survey 
respondents would understand.  Three questions were used to develop a construct for the 
issue of cheating.  The first question asked respondents if it was possible to artificially 
inflate performance, the second inquired more specifically if the respondent was aware of 
others who artificially inflated performance, and the last question asked if the respondent 
had felt pressure from someone else to artificially inflate performance. 
 Each of these questions attempted to find a slightly different angle into the issue 
of cheating.  The first was quite vague, only asking respondents to share their feelings of 
whether it was possible to cheat.  The second became more specific in that respondents 
were asked if they suspected others of engaging in these types of behavior.  The last was 
the most specific and asked respondents if they themselves felt pressure to cheat.  In 
order to pass IRB scrutiny, none of the questions followed up with the obvious question 
of whether the respondents actually engaged in cheating behaviors.  While this ultimately 
would be the question to ask, ethical considerations prohibited it from being included in 
the survey. 
 Regardless of which question was asked, the overwhelming majority of 
respondents reported that cheating did not occur in their organizations.  This was true 
among high, medium, and low performing organizations alike.  The aggregate survey 
results for the question measuring awareness of others cheating had the highest 
agreement rate (34.5 percent), while the affirmative responses concerning feeling 
pressure to cheat was staggeringly low (less than 10 percent).  These findings did not 
differ much when analyzed at the state level. 
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 These findings were not consistent with the expectations of this study.  At the 
onset of the study, it was felt that cheating, as constructed through the idea of artificially 
inflating performance, would be greater among high performing states.  This hypothesis 
was supported by the idea that high performing states (and workers) would be more 
willing to cheat in order to maximize the amount of incentive dollars the state earned.  
This relationship between cheating and the performance (or incentive) level of the state 
did not emerge.  There was essentially no difference on the cheating measures between 
the four state programs.  This finding presented a real surprise to the researcher and 
brings into question the incentive-based assumptions of the principal-agent model. 
 In order to develop further understanding into the issue of cheating, bivariate 
cross-tabulations were used to explore the relationship between cheating and eight 
independent variables (organizational performance, job stress, strategizing, supervision, 
job satisfaction, role ambiguity, role conflict, and understanding of performance appraisal 
methods).  These eight independent variables were included in the analysis on the basis 
that they were identified in the literature as important concepts in relation to the issue of 
cheating. 
 While there were some differences between the state programs, two variables 
emerged as statistically significant in relation to the constructs for cheating (possibility of 
cheating and awareness of others cheating).  These variables were job satisfaction, and 
role conflict, both of which constituted the basis for the fourth significant finding of the 
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Finding #4—The Importance of Role Conflict  
and Job Satisfaction with Cheating 
 
One of the most significant findings of this study was that job satisfaction and role 
conflict were directly linked with cheating when defined as artificially inflating 
performance levels.  In the cross-tabulation analysis, both role ambiguity and job 
satisfaction were found to be statistically significant.  Using principal-agent theory as a 
foundation, it was not surprising to find that role conflict was linked with cheating.  Role 
conflict suggests respondents experienced degrees of confusion by not having their job 
duties and responsibilities clearly defined.  Principal-agency theory posits that in order to 
have agents comply with the desires of principals, roles should be clearly defined.  When 
these roles are not clearly defined, agents are free to pursue their own self-interest. 
Given the underpinnings of principal-agent theory, it was not a surprise to find 
that low role conflict respondents were likely to report low and moderate levels of 
cheating (both for the possibility of cheating measure as well as the awareness of others 
cheating measurement).  This finding is clearly in line with the constructs of principal-
agency theory.  The importance of these findings were enhanced by the results from 
logistic regression analysis that found that knowing role conflict levels increased the 
results of successfully predicting “yes” respondents for feeling pressure to cheat.   
The second variable that emerged as significant in the analysis was job 
satisfaction.  Job satisfaction was found to be linked with the awareness of others 
cheating variable.  However the data demonstrated an interesting dichotomy between the 
variables.  While one would reasonably expect to find high job satisfaction levels 
resulting in lower levels of reported cheating, the data demonstrated an almost equal split 
between high and low awareness levels among high job satisfaction respondents.  This 
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pattern in the data did not present itself among medium and low job satisfaction 
respondents. 
When analyzed at the state level, similar statistically significant relationships 
emerged between job satisfaction and awareness of others cheating among the two 
moderate incentive states.  In relation to these variables, the analysis demonstrated 
similar bifurcated results for both State B and C respondents as was reported in the 
aggregate analysis of the data.  This polarized response set among high job satisfaction 
respondents remain unresolved by this analysis.  Unfortunately, the data do not provide 
any additional insights into why this pattern continually emerged. 
However, when the variable of job satisfaction was placed in the regression 
model, it emerged as being negatively related to successfully predicting “yes” responses 
to the question regarding the respondent’s feeling pressure to cheat.  The negative value 
suggested that decreases in job satisfaction rates correlated with higher successful 
predictions of yes responses in the model.   
Regardless of the context, one of the conclusions of this study is that job 
satisfaction rates are related to different dependent variables used to describe cheating.  
This is an important finding because it demonstrates the importance job satisfaction 
levels can have for cheating behaviors.  What remains unclear is the reason behind the 
split response rates regarding cheating among high job satisfaction respondents.  The split 
nature of the response set warrants further academic inquiry to see if these patterns are 
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Finding #5—Respondent’s Ideas About the  
Possibility of Cheating Are Related to  
Feeling Pressure to Cheat 
 
 The regression analysis found that responses to the question that asked 
respondents if it was possible to inflate performance was a statistically significant 
predictor of “yes” responses for individuals feeling pressure to cheat.  This finding 
suggests a mild, but important, link between the way one thinks about being able to cheat 
and if they actually felt pressure to cheat.  The analysis suggests that higher responses 
regarding the possibility of cheating result in significantly increased odds in successfully 
predicting one’s feelings of pressure to cheat. 
This discovery is important in that it demonstrates the idea that if one thinks it is 
possible to inflate performance, they may also feel pressure to act upon that behavior.  
The study is incapable of following up on this important question, but what emerges is 
the idea that one’s perceptions of cheating may result in one’s feeling pressure to cheat.  
Whether that pressure is real, or perceived, the fact remains that identifying with the idea 
of being able to cheat may also influence one’s sense of feeling pressure to cheat.  
Unfortunately, the survey tool does not provide a method through which to explore this 
issue further.  However, this idea of how perceptions of cheating may be a precursor to 
other aspects of cheating warrants future research consideration. 
 
Finding #6—Limitations of the Principal- 
Agent Model 
 
 The most significant finding of this research is the limitation of the applicability 
of the principal-agent model in the four cases studied here.  Because of the availability of 
incentive dollars for programs, it seemed reasonable at the onset of the study that front-
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line workers would have a clear sense of the incentive tasks that would result in increased 
dollars for each state’s respective program.  In addition, the expectation that respondents 
from higher incentive earning states would report more incidents of organizational 
cheating to enhance those incentives was a rational conclusion of the principal-agent 
model.  Neither of these expected outcomes emerged from the study. 
 While this study was modest in its conception, it does demonstrate some 
limitations with the principal-agent model.  While principal-agent theory dismisses more 
altruistic approaches that explain behavior, the fact that such potential motivators as job 
satisfaction were found to have an impact on cheating is an important finding in and of 
itself.  Future inquiries into the issue of cheating might find it beneficial to adopt 




 In this conclusion, several suggestions have been made concerning areas meriting 
future consideration as part of a comprehensive research agenda on the issue of cheating.  
A couple of additional ideas deserve some attention regarding this matter.  First, this 
study was limited in nature by the relatively small number of state programs that agreed 
to participate.  While this study has provided important insights and ideas concerning 
cheating, a more comprehensive approach to studying the issue of cheating within the 
child support program is deserved.    
 The fact that the child support program is designed around quantitative 
performance measures makes it an excellent source for studying the issue of cheating.  
The fact that the program has adopted a comprehensive incentive system that rewards 
state programs for good performance only enhances the idea that the program operates 
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within an environment that could produce continued insight into the issues of cheating.  
While this study focused on four state programs representing different performance 
levels, improved conclusions could be reached if more state programs were examined 
further. 
 In a related issue, this study focused solely on state administered child support 
programs.  While there is no prescribed method for administering child support programs 
by the federal government, each state is left to decide whether the state should directly 
oversee the day-to-day operations of the program, or allow local county governments to 
carry out this task.  In addition, there is a growing presence of privately contracted 
companies that provide full child support services on behalf of state and county 
governments. 
 It is reasonable to expect to find important differences between state operated and 
county managed child support programs in regard to cheating activities.  These 
differences deserve further attention and could certainly further improved understanding 
of how cheating activities differ based upon the way a program is administered.  Of 
particular interest, however, is how cheating activities vary among privately operated 
child support programs.  These privately contracted businesses and corporations operate 
on the basis of a profit motive.  This underlying motivation to maximize profits would be 
of particular interest in studying the issue of cheating and would provide an interesting 
venue to explore the issues of principal-agency theory further. 
 Finally, this study operationalized the dependent variable of cheating in terms 
equating to being able to artificially inflate performance levels.  Defining cheating in this 
way allowed the study to focus on a relatively well-understood concept and resulted in a 
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good way to analyze the issue of cheating.  However, cheating is not always construed in 
such an obvious manner.  The author suggests that cheating is frequently a more nuanced 
subject matter. 
 In order to fully understand the issue of cheating, further research needs to focus 
on less subtle ways of cheating.  For instance, OCSE has provided detailed regulatory 
instruction to states regarding the issue of case closure (45 CFR 303.11).  While the 
categories given to states attempt to be as clear as possible, they remain open to some 
interpretation on the part of states.  When it comes to performance measurement, it makes 
sense to try to close cases where payments are not being made.  States may have made 
policy decisions to try to reduce the number of “bad cases” by broadly interpreting these 
federal regulations.  As a result, front-line workers may be engaging in “cheating,” but 
may not realize it because they are following their organization’s policy.  In conclusion, 
cheating is a complex and nuanced subject matter.  Further research should recognize 
these complexities and attempt to address them appropriately. 
 In a republican form of government, citizens should, and do, have high 
expectations for the government programs that exist because of taxpayers funds.  We all 
expect our government agencies to operate efficiently, effectively, and fairly.  In order to 
achieve these goals, monitoring of performance is essential.  However, performance 
measures and incentives have a dark side that warrants even more scrutiny to ensure these 
programs are operating both fairly and effectively.  This study has attempted to focus on 
the issue of cheating in an effort to understand one of the unintended consequences that 
can result from using these types of systems.  
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Child support professionals have a long-standing tradition of viewing their work 
in terms of helping children and families obtain a reliable stream of financial resources 
which they are entitled to receive.  The sense of pride and accomplishment in their work 
was something this study was able to clearly measure among the four states that 
participated in this study.  Child support workers feel that their work is important and that 
they contribute to society in meaningful ways. 
 The overwhelming number of these workers also felt that cheating, or efforts to 
artificially inflate performance, was not rampant in their organizations.  However, a small 
minority reported to the contrary of this idea and suggested that cheating, to some degree, 
was possible, and they themselves felt pressure to cheat.  This small minority was the 
primary focus of this study. 
 The conclusions reached here provide valuable knowledge for child support 
administrators specifically and generally for the public administration literature to 
consider.  The findings suggesting the role job satisfaction and role conflict play in 
predicting increased likelihoods of cheating is important to recognize.  While continued 
oversight to discourage these unethical practices should be encouraged, the data 
presented here suggest that administrators can also take proactive measures to help 
reduce incidents of cheating within their organizations. 
 Performance management of government agencies is not going to go away.  If 
anything, President Obama’s promise to make government more transparent will only 
exacerbate the need to measure performance objectively.  The media, elected officials, 
and most importantly, citizens demand that agencies find a way to measure their 
successes (and failures).  However, we all should recognize the “dark side” of 
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performance management and realize that the use of performance measures and 
incentives is not an end in itself.  Developing a better understanding of the negative 
consequences (as well as their relevance to worker effectiveness) of these types of 
systems will aide public administrators in their efforts to improve performance while, at 




STATE “A” PROFILE DATA 
 
 
Managed: Administered Centrally by the State 
Orders: 
PEP Method: Statewide Measure 
Percent of 2006 Budget Comprised of Federal Incentives: 
  
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Number of FTEs 237 256 267 256 256 248 247 247 
Caseload Size 46,806 47,008 46,405 46,385 46,387 46,543 45,259 44,989 
Total Collections $77,696,981 $80,565,137 $87,170,029 $90,406,771 $91,662,934 $92,130,442 $93,943,460 $89,948,499 
Collections per FTE $327,835 $314,708 $326,480 $353,151 $358,058 $371,494 $380,338 $364,164 
PEP Score (IV-D) n/a 79.80% 77.00% 80.70% 113.80% 132.80% 94.50% 95.40% 
PEP Score (State) n/a 99.10% 87.80%** 89.60%** 89.10% 91.80% 104.80% 98.00% 
Obligation Rate 77.60% 78.50% 78.70% 82.90% 82.84% 86.80% 92.40% 92.20% 
Current Support % 47.99% 49.20% 51.20% 53.80% 55.70% 55.50% 54.96% 54.90% 
Arrears Percentage 63.60% 65.10% 68.50% 67.40% 67.60% 66.60% 67.50% 66.50% 
Cost Effective Ratio $4.41  $3.89  $4.14  $4.49  $4.24  $4.50  $4.54  $4.27  
 
* Failed Data Reliability Audits 









STATE “B” PROFILE DATA 
 
 
Managed: Centrally by the State 
Orders: 
PEP Method: IV-D Measure 




 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Number of FTEs 1,610 1,604 1,605 1,595 1,579 1,659 1,659 1,691 
Caseload Size 489,350 504,174 461,948 426,096 417,936 409,041 405,706 410,399 
Total Collections $895,492,604 $432,456,835 $509,821,267 $516,190,069 $541,756,357 $577,602,255 $613,436,219 $629,918,294 
Collections per FTE $556,207 $269,611 $317,646 $323,630 $343,101 $348,163 $369,763 $372,512 
PEP Score (IV-D) n/a 61.50%* ** 81.60%** 84.40%** 91.00% 93.30% 96.40% 97.70% 
PEP Score (State) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Obligation Rate 53.90% 56.60% 65.80% 73.20% 76.35% 78.80% 80.88% 81.05% 
Current Support % 59.80% 59.20% 60.40% 61.30% 61.80% 62.70% 64.50% 65.60% 
Arrears Percentage 48.10% 70.70% 69.30%* 60.30% 58.40% 61.00% 62.20% 63.40% 
Cost Effective Ratio $2.93  $3.86  $4.04  $4.43  $4.99  $5.01  $5.10  $4.97  
 
*Failed Data Reliability Audits 








STATE “C” PROFILE DATA 
 
 
Managed: Centrally by the State 
Orders: 
PEP Method: Statewide Measure 
Percent of 2006 Budget Comprised of Federal Incentives: 
 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Number of FTEs 556 629 613 620 577 590 606 650 
Caseload Size 139,831 143,163 148,423 140,798 137,115 151,410 166,320 174,065 
Total Collections $109,503,070 $120,078,595 $129,628,049 $146,408,283 $152,298,459 $167,819,695 $194,828,277 $222,953,925 
Collections per FTE $196,948 $190,904 $211,465 $236,142 $263,949 $284,440 $321,499 $343,006 
PEP Score (IV-D) n/a 32.70% 45.10% 46.60% 49.40% 58.60% 61.00% 65.50% 
PEP Score (State) n/a 81.40%** 86.30%** 80.70%** 92.60% 104.60% 112.40% 122.10% 
Obligation Rate 60.40% 61.90% 63.60% 69.70% 70.80% 69.50% 69.09% 69.63% 
Current Support % 42.50% 44.30% 45.10% 46.50% 48.40% 48.60% 50.10% 52.70% 
Arrears Percentage 56.00% 52.20% 53.80% 56.80% 57.40% 57.50% 55.20% 59.90% 
Cost Effective Ratio $3.37  $2.83  $2.90  $2.80  $3.12  $3.64  $3.79  $3.99  
 
 
*Failed Data Reliability Audits 








STATE “D” PROFILE DATA 
 
 
Managed: Centrally by the State 
Orders: 
PEP Method: Statewide Measure 
Percent of 2006 Budge Comprised of Federal Incentives: 
 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Number of FTEs 1,273 1,307 1,403 1,308 1,283 1,001 1,041 930 
Caseload Size 362,156 371,804 386,360 390,538 383,780 383,021 377,390 367,901 
Total Collections $320,786,071 $374,637,687 $410,254,564 $449,078,457 $481,019,369 $505,638,189 $530,679,551 $549,731,451 
Collections per FTE $251,992 $286,639 $292,412 $343,332 $374,918 $505,133 $509,779 $591,109 
PEP Score (IV-D) n/a 81.30% 83.60% 86.00% 88.90% 72.80% 89.10% 106.10% 
PEP Score (State) n/a 91.10% 86.70%** 79.70%** 85.50%** 88.90%** 92.50% 92.90% 
Obligation Rate 71.10% 73.80% 76.10% 78.90% 79.48% 80.70% 81.63% 82.81% 
Current Support % 43.20% 47.80% 49.20% 50.70% 52.70% 53.30% 54.70% 55.70% 
Arrears Percentage 45.30% 47.30% 47.30% 50.00% 50.08% 51.60% 52.10% 53.40% 
Cost Effective Ratio $3.26  $3.37  $3.81  $4.63  $4.95  $5.40  $5.41  $5.58  
 
 
*Failed Data Reliability Audits 









CHILD SUPPORT SURVEY 
 
 
Child Support Professionals Survey 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey.  The purpose of this survey is to 
explore the attitudes, beliefs, and practices of child support professionals from around the 
country.  Your responses to this survey will help develop data that will be used to 
improve the field of child support enforcement.  Your participation in this survey is 
voluntary, and you are not required to answer these questions.  If you choose to respond 
to the survey, please identify the response that best represents your own viewpoints.  
Your responses will remain anonymous, although the aggregate (total) data results may 
be shared with interested states from around the country.  Again, thank you for your 
service to the children in your area and taking the time to respond to this survey. 
 
1. How many years have you been in your current position? (DEMOGRAPHIC) 
 
2. How many years have you worked in the area of child support enforcement? 
(DEMOGRAPHIC) 
 
3. How many years have you worked in the public sector? (DEMOGRAPHIC) 
 
4. I receive adequate training to accomplish the job tasks that are expected from me. 
(TRAINING) 
a. STRONGLY AGREE 
b. AGREE 
c. SOMEWHAT AGREE 
d. SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
e. DISAGREE 
f. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
g. DON’T KNOW 
 
5. My agency receives additional funding for outstanding organizational 
performance. (INCENTIVE AWARENESS) 
a. YES 
b. NO 









c. DON’T KNOW 
 




c. DON’T KNOW 
 
8. Please rate how important each of the following is for your agency using a scale 
of 1-10, with one being the least importance and ten being the highest importance, 
please rate the degree of importance the following issues are for your agency.  
(INCENTIVE AWARENESS) 
a. IV-A (TANF) COLLECTIONS 
b. PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT 
c. RESPONSIVENESS TO CUSTOMERS 
d. ESTABLISHING CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS 
e. COST CONTROLS 
f. MANAGEABLE CASELOAD SIZES 
g. CURRENT SUPPORT COLLECTIONS 
h. PAST DUE SUPPORT COLLECTIONS 
i. COST EFFECTIVENESS 
j. TOTAL COLLECTIONS 
k. FEDERAL TIMEFRAMES 
l. DON’T KNOW 
 
9. My individual performance impacts my organization’s overall performance. 
(INCENTIVE AWARENESS) 
a. STRONGLY AGREE 
b. AGREE 
c. NEITHER AGREE OR DISAGREE 
d. DISAGREE 
e. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
f. DON’T KNOW 
 
10. I have spent time discussing strategies with my co-workers to improve my 
individual performance. (INCENTIVE STRATEGY) 
a. STRONGLY AGREE 
b. AGREE 
c. NEITHER AGREE OR DISAGREE 
d. DISAGREE 
e. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
f. DON’T KNOW 
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11.  I have spent time discussing strategies with my supervisor to improve my 
individual performance. (INCENTIVE STRATEGY) 
a. STRONGLY AGREE 
b. AGREE 
c. NEITHER AGREE OR DISAGREE 
d. DISAGREE 
e. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
f. DON’T KNOW 
 
12. My organization spends a lot of time developing strategies to increase 
performance in key areas. (INCENTIVE STRATEGY) 
a. STRONGLY AGREE 
b. AGREE 
c. NEITHER AGREE OR DISAGREE 
d. DISAGREE 
e. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
f. DON’T KNOW 
 
13. It is possible to take actions in my caseload that will inflate my individual 
performance levels. (MANIPULATION) 
a. STRONGLY AGREE 
b. AGREE 
c. NEITHER AGREE OR DISAGREE 
d. DISAGREE 
e. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
f. DON’T KNOW 
 
14. I am aware of others in my organization who take actions to inflate their 
individual performance levels. (MANIPULATION) 
a. STRONGLY AGREE 
b. AGREE 
c. NEITHER AGREE OR DISAGREE 
d. DISAGREE 
e. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
f. DON’T KNOW 
 
15. In the past year, I have felt pressure from someone in my agency to manipulate 
my caseload to improve performance. (MANIPULATION) 
a. YES 
b. NO 






16. If I make a mistake in my work, it is likely to be noticed by someone and I will be 
held accountable for the mistake. (MONITORING) 
a. STRONGLY AGREE 
b. AGREE 
c. SOMEWHAT AGREE 
d. SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
e. DISAGREE 
f. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
g. DON’T KNOW 
 
17. It is important to enter accurate information into the computer system. 
(ACCURACY/QUALITY) 
a. STRONGLY AGREE 
b. AGREE 
c. SOMEWHAT AGREE 
d. SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
e. DISAGREE 
f. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
g. DON’T KNOW 
 
18. The quality of my work is closely monitored. (ACCURACY/QUALITY) 
a. STRONGLY AGREE 
b. AGREE 
c. SOMEWHAT AGREE 
d. SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
e. DISAGREE 
f. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
g. DON’T KNOW 
 
19. My agency emphasizes quantity of work over the quality of work. (QUALITY) 
a. STRONGLY AGREE 
b. AGREE 
c. SOMEWHAT AGREE 
d. SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
e. DISAGREE 
f. STRONGLY DISAGREE 











20. There is a need to reduce some parts of my job* (ROLE OVERLOAD) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
d. AGREE 
e. STRONGLY AGREE 
f. DON’T KNOW 
 
21. I feel overburdened in my job* (ROLE OVERLOAD) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
d. AGREE 
e. STRONGLY AGREE 
f. DON’T KNOW 
 
22. I have been given too much responsibility* (ROLE OVERLOAD) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
d. AGREE 
e. STRONGLY AGREE 
f. DON’T KNOW 
 
23. My workload is too heavy* (ROLE OVERLOAD) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
d. AGREE 
e. STRONGLY AGREE 
f. DON’T KNOW 
 
24. The amount of work I have to do interferes with the quality I want to maintain* 
(ROLE OVERLOAD) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
d. AGREE 
e. STRONGLY AGREE 








25. I have clear planned goals and objectives for my job* (ROLE AMBIGUITY) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
d. AGREE 
e. STRONGLY AGREE 
f. DON’T KNOW 
 
26. I know exactly what is expected of me* (ROLE AMBIGUITY) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
d. AGREE 
e. STRONGLY AGREE 
f. DON’T KNOW 
 
27. I know what my responsibilities are* (ROLE AMBIGUITY) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
d. AGREE 
e. STRONGLY AGREE 
f. DON’T KNOW 
 
28. I feel certain about how much responsibility I have* (ROLE AMBIGUITY) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
d. AGREE 
e. STRONGLY AGREE 
f. DON’T KNOW 
 
29. My responsibilities are clearly defined* (ROLE AMBIGUITY) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
d. AGREE 
e. STRONGLY AGREE 









30. I often get involved in situations in which there are conflicting requirements* 
(ROLE CONFLICT) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
d. AGREE 
e. STRONGLY AGREE 
f. DON’T KNOW 
 
31. I receive incompatible requests from two or more people* (ROLE CONFLICT) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
d. AGREE 
e. STRONGLY AGREE 
f. DON’T KNOW 
 
32. I have to do things that should be done differently under different conditions* 
(ROLE CONFLICT) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
d. AGREE 
e. STRONGLY AGREE 
f. DON’T KNOW 
 
33. My Supervisor always seems to be around checking on my work* 
(SUPERVISION CONTROL) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
d. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
e. SOMEWHAT AGREE 
f. AGREE 
g. STRONGLY AGREE 











34. My supervisor tells me what shall be done and how it shall be done* 
(SUPERVISION CONTROL) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
d. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
e. SOMEWHAT AGREE 
f. AGREE 
g. STRONGLY AGREE 
h. DON’T KNOW 
 
35. My supervisor never gives me a chance to make important decisions on my own* 
(SUPERVISION CONTROL) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
d. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
e. SOMEWHAT AGREE 
f. AGREE 
g. STRONGLY AGREE 
h. DON’T KNOW 
 
36. My supervisor leaves it up to me to decide how to go about doing my job* 
(SUPERVISION CONTROL) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
d. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
e. SOMEWHAT AGREE 
f. AGREE 
g. STRONGLY AGREE 
h. DON’T KNOW 
 
37. In choosing which daily tasks I do each day, I often choose tasks because I know 
my agency keeps track of them rather than choosing the task which I believe to be 
the most important. (TASK PRIORITIZATION) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
d. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
e. SOMEWHAT AGREE 
f. AGREE 
g. STRONGLY AGREE 




38. All in all, I am satisfied with my job.* (JOB SATISFACTION) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
d. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
e. SOMEWHAT AGREE 
f. AGREE 
g. STRONGLY AGREE 
h. DON’T KNOW 
 
39. In general, I like working for this agency. * (JOB SATISFACTION) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
d. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
e. SOMEWHAT AGREE 
f. AGREE 
g. STRONGLY AGREE 
h. DON’T KNOW 
 
40. I understand the standards of performance my employer expects. 
*(PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
d. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
e. SOMEWHAT AGREE 
f. AGREE 
g. STRONGLY AGREE 
h. DON’T KNOW 
 
41. My supervisor and I concur on the meaning of the criteria used in the performance 
appraisal system. * (PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
d. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
e. SOMEWHAT AGREE 
f. AGREE 
g. STRONGLY AGREE 






42. My employer clearly communicates to me the objectives of the performance 
appraisal system.  * (PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
d. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
e. SOMEWHAT AGREE 
f. AGREE 
g. STRONGLY AGREE 
h. DON’T KNOW 
 
43. Procedures regarding the performance appraisal system are not generally 
understood by the employees in my organization. * (PERFORMANCE 
APPRAISAL) 
a. STRONGLY DISAGREE 
b. DISAGREE 
c. SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
d. NEITHER DISAGREE OR AGREE 
e. SOMEWHAT AGREE 
f. AGREE 
g. STRONGLY AGREE 
h. DON’T KNOW 
 




45. What year were you born? (DEMOGRAPHIC) 
 
 
46.  What is your race? 
       a.  CAUCASIAN 
            b.  AFRICAN AMERICAN 
            c.  ASIAN 
            d.  HISPANIC 
            e.  NATIVE AMERICAN 
            f.  DON’T KNOW/CHOOSE NOT TO ANSWER 
 










48. What is your annual salary? (DEMOGRAPHIC) 
a. LESS THAN $20,000 PER YEAR 
b. BETWEEN $20,000 AND $29,999 PER YEAR 
c. BETWEEN $30,000 AND $39,999 PER YEAR 
d. BETWEEN $40,000 AND $49,999 PER YEAR 
e. BETWEEN $50,000 AND $59,999 PER YEAR 
f. MORE THAN $60,000 PER YEAR 
g. DON’T KNOW/CHOOSE NOT TO ANSWER 
 
49. What is the highest level of education you have completed? (DEMOGRAPHIC) 
a. LESS THAN A HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE 
b. HIGH SCHOOL/GED 
c. SOME COLLEGE 
d. COLLEGE  
e. GRADUATE SCHOOL 
f. DOCTORATE 
g. DON’T KNOW/CHOOSE NOT TO ANSWER 
 
50. Is there anything else you would like to share regarding your work performance? 
(QUALITATIVE) 
 






















SCALE QUESTIONS AND CONSTRUCTION 
 




26. I have clear planned goals and 
objectives for my job. 
1-11 
 
1-3 = Low 
4-8 = Medium 
9-11 = High 
 
27. I know exactly what is expected of 
me 
28.  I know what my responsibilities 
are. 
29.  I feel certain about how much 
responsibility I have. 
30.  My responsibilities are clearly 
defined. 
Role Conflict 
31.  I often get involved in situations in 
which there are conflicting 
requirements. 
1-7 
1-2 = Low 
3-5 = Medium 
6-7 = High 
32.  I receive incompatible requests 
from two or more people. 
33.  I have to do things that should be 
done differently under different 
conditions. 
Job Satisfaction 
39.  All in all, I am satisfied with my 
job. 1-5 
 
1-2 = Low 
3 = Medium 
4-5 = High 40. In general, I like working for this agency. 
Supervision 
17. If I make a mistake in my work, it is 
likely to be noticed… 
1-9 
1-3 = Low 
4-6 = Medium 
7-9 = High 
19. The quality of my work is closely 
monitored. 
34.  My supervisor always seems to be 
around checking on my work. 
35.  My supervisor tells me what shall 
be done and how it shall be done. 
Job Stress 
23.  I have been given too much 
responsibility. 
1-11 
1-3 = Low 
4-8 = Medium 
9-11 = High 
 
24.  My workload is too heavy. 
25. The amount of work I have to do 












11.  I have spent time discussing 
strategies with my co-workers to 
improve my individual performance. 
1-7 
1-2 = Low 
3-5 = Medium 
6-7 = High 
12. I have spent time discussing 
strategies with my supervisor to 
improve my individual performance. 
13.  My organization spends a lot of 





41.  I understand the standards of 
performance my employer expects. 
1-7 
1-2 = Low 
3-5 = Medium 
6-7 = High 
42.  My supervisor and I concur on 
the meaning of the criteria used in 
the performance appraisal system. 
43. My employer clearly 
communicates tome the objectives 
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